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The Muezzin~s Call and the Dow Jones Bell: On the
 
Necessity of Realism in the Study of Islamic Law
 
The dark haired Christian beauty­

Who permitted her to slay my healthy Muslim self
 
Unconcerned with her and about her?
 
I reproach the murder at her hands.
 
I saw her strike the church bells....
 
I called to her 'come to me, for you are inspired
 
by God, and I am enthralled by you' ....
 
Then I said to my soul, 'which causes you more pain,
 
her distance from you, or the striking of the church bells?'
 
Nadhim AI-Ghazali (1920-1963) 
The central flaw in the current approach to shari'a in the Ameri­
can legal academy is the reliance on the false assumption that contem­
porary Islamic rules are derived from classical doctrine. This has led 
both admirers and detractors of the manner in which shari'a is stud­
ied to focus their energies on obsolete medieval rules that bear no rela­
tionship to the manner in which modern Muslims approach shari'a 
The reality is that given the structural pluralism of the rules of the 
classical era, there is no sensible way that modern rules could be de­
rived from classical doctrine, either in letter or in spirit, and all efforts 
to do so have largely failed. As with all historical approaches to the 
law, the past becomes no more than an invention of the present, a 
means to validate an approach rather than any true reflection of the 
practices and norms of a previous era. Thus, modern Islamic rules 
are not a resurrection of classical era rules, but rather are largely the 
product of mediation among competing influences in Muslim society. 
Within and even beyond Islamic finance, the two major influences are, 
on the one hand, resistance, clothed in Islamic rhetoric, against the 
dominant global economic and political order in order to create a sep­
arate Muslim sphere within which the Muslim polity may operate, 
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and on the other, the need to engage the broader global order, commer­
cially and politically, in order to restore some level of political and 
economic power to the Muslim world. A proper study of influences of 
this sort that have led large numbers of Muslims to adopt particular 
shari'a positions on economics, finance, war, and numerous other 
realms is absolutely vital in the post 9/11 era in order to understand 
and engage substantial, important segments of the Muslim commu­
nity in their call for a reinvigoration of the shari'a. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Among critics and sympathizers alike, a deeply flawed and 
largely formalist paradigm has become commonly accepted in the 
American legal academy concerning contemporary Islamic law, the 
abandonment of which will lead to a greater understanding of how 
the Islamicity of law should be evaluated in our times. The approach 
the article proposes is one that neither attempts, as sympathizers 
would have it, to resurrect obsolete medieval doctrine entirely irrele­
vant to the lives of contemporary Muslims, nor ignores, as critics 
wish, the clearly pan-national religious revivalist agenda and the Is­
lamic reactions thereto and consequences thereof, all of which will 
have significant impact on the Muslim world for the foreseeable 
future. 
Rather, using the example of Islamic finance, this article con­
tends that while Islamic law remains an important subject to be stud­
ied and taught in American law schools separate from the laws ofthe 
Muslim nations, the focus of any inquiry into Islamic law should not 
be on the classical rules. This is because classical doctrine is not and 
cannot be the source of modern rules in any meaningful capacity 
other than the rhetorical.! This article therefore develops an alterna­
tive paradigm based on the work of the American Legal Realists, and 
their emphasis on the importance of social, cultural, and economic 
forces on the development oflegal doctrine. I will demonstrate in this 
1. There is a crucial difference between the position of this article, that neither 
the letter nor the spirit of classical doctrine can be the basis of Islamic law in the 
modern era, and the contention that all of Islamic law, faith, theology, philosophy, 
and mysticism can be entirely explained by materialist factors such as those identi­
fied in this article. This article does not address whether or not some types ofparticu­
larly authoritative texts (for example, a Qur'anic verse) have any value at all in the 
determination of legal rules, nor does the article discuss the extent to which law is a 
semi-autonomous institution which not only retains its integrity in the short term as 
political institutions and interest groups within any given society shift, but indeed 
shapes the "content of the immediate self-interest of social groups." Robert W. 
Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 101 (1984). Moreover, there is 
no intent on my part to deal in any capacity with the rich areas of Islamic thought 
that lie beyond the purview of the law and the influence of material factors on them. 
The claim is altogether a simpler one, relating purely to the relevance of classical 
doctrine, developed for the most part more than half a millennium ago, to modern 
Muslim law. 
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article that the body of Islamic rules and norms, referred to herein by 
the Arabic term shari'a, can be most accurately understood as a con­
tinuing form of mediation between two primary influences within the 
modern Muslim community, with the classical doctrine at best serv­
ing no more than a rhetorical function. These two influences are, on 
the one hand, a desire to articulate a form of political, economic, and 
social order that resists the dominant global paradigms and creates a 
separate, self-defined Islamic identity resting on unique ethical and 
moral bases, and on the other, the necessity of engaging the global 
community on a variety of levels in order to restore some level of po­
litical and economic power to the Muslim world. Through Islamic fi­
nance, the article highlights a central flaw assumed by nearly all 
scholarly literature concerning modern approaches to the shari'a in 
the American legal academy; namely, that it ignores such influences 
and bestows far too much attention upon obsolete classical doctrine 
at the expense of understanding how contemporary Muslims evaluate 
and approach questions of Islam and law. 
Part II of this article discusses some of the current obsessions 
with Islamic classical doctrine in U.S. law schools. Turning to Is­
lamic finance as the central example of the thesis of the article, Part 
III provides an explanation of the structure of classical Islamic law, 
gives some background on some of the basic commercial prohibitions 
of the classical era, and demonstrates how none of this could be the 
basis of any recognizable modern commercial practice. Part IV sets 
forth the methodologies used in Islamic finance to derive rules from 
classical prohibitions and shows them to be so selective and opportu­
nistic in application as not to be sensible if understood to be a faithful 
rendition of classical rules. Part V provides an alternative explana­
tion for the rise of Islamic finance and economics, having more to do 
with fundamentalist Islamic revivalism as a form of resistance to the 
broader global order than faithfulness to classical doctrine. Part VI 
explains how giants in the world of finance, seeking to use the revolu­
tionary fervor gripping the Muslim world to their own financial ad­
vantage, influenced the development of Islamic finance in a manner 
that tamed the more radical impulses of the revivalists to develop a 
practice that used the rhetoric of resistance and revolution to practice 
something that looks very much like ordinary finance, though doctri­
nal fundamentalist influence remains. Part VII discusses the means 
by which this current paradigm suggests alternative ways to under­
stand and approach shari'a in a broader context, beyond the limits of 
Islamic finance. 
II. ON THE FORMALIST OBSESSIONS OF OUR TIMES 
As the mythology goes, despite the political and cultural influ­
ence of revivalist movements from time to time in the modern era, 
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formal, historic classical rules generally control Islamic doctrine. 
Under this theory, harmony (of either the textual or purposive sort) 
with this clearly established and largely immutable set of rules devel­
oped centuries ago ultimately determines the legitimacy of any pur­
portedly Islamic approach to any particular issue.2 Some 
commentators have moved away from this paradigm slightly and ac­
knowledged that there has been a drift to some extent from reliance 
on classical doctrine, but nonetheless tend to regard the classical 
rules as some sort of independent backdrop against which contempo­
rary notions might be measured.3 Others indicate that there are 
many disparate approaches to a modern Islamic legal theory, among 
them attempted recreations of classical doctrine, in either a purpo­
sive fashion or through the careful, literal selection of classical rules.4 
Regardless of the approach, rarely5 is the supposed hold of classical 
doctrine on at least substantial portions of the modern Muslim imagi­
nation seriously questioned. 
One thoughtful critic, Lama Abu Odeh, has seized on this as­
sumption in her work decrying the study of Islamic law in U.S. law 
schools as currently undertaken. She insists, properly, that classical 
rules are not the law of modern nation states in the Muslim world; 
rather, in the post colonial era, for the most part, the law is a civil 
code in all areas but the law of the family, which she describes, some­
what inaccurately, or at least reductively, as a "transplant."6 Given 
this, Professor Abu Odeh has called on the academy to acknowledge 
the obsolescence of some form of pure, generalized Islamic law, and to 
focus on this reality in teaching and studying Islamic law and its re­
2. Sherman Jackson, Shari'ah, Democracy and the Modern Nation State, Some 
Reflections on Islam, Popular Rule and Pluralism, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 88, 92 
(2003) [hereinafter "Shari'a"] (differentiating between traditional, classical Islamic 
rules and fundamentalist movements). OLIVIER Roy, THE FAILURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM 
35-39 (1992); FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES III, ISLAMIC LAw AND FINANCE: 
RELIGION, RISK AND RETURN 77 n.2 (1998). 
3. See, e.g., Ann Elizabeth Mayer, War and Peace in the Islamic Tradition and 
International Law, in JUST WAR AND JIHAD (John Kelsay & James Turner Johnson 
eds., 1991) (indicating that "the [Islamic] premodern juristic tradition on war and 
peace may now be weakening, but its concepts have by no means ceased to influence 
Muslims' perspectives"). 
4. See CLARK LOMBARDI, STATE LAw AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT 81,92-94 
(2006) (describing classical doctrine driven techniques ranging from selection of rules 
from the classical corpus to create a modern legal code, to drafting a legal code from 
studying and understanding the broad, underlying principles of the classical rules). 
5. It is important to note that not every scholar in the legal academy discussing' 
Islamic law is necessarily obsessed with the classical era, though many of the most 
highly regarded certainly are. For notable exceptions, see note 50 and accompanying 
text (respecting the work of Professor Abdullahi An-Nairn); note 220 and accompany­
ing text (respecting Professor Feldman's approach to modern applications of shari'a); 
and note 223 (respecting Professor Freamon's impressive work on modern Islamic at­
titudes towards slavery). 
6. Lama Abu Odeh, The Politics of (Mis)recognition: Islamic Law Pedagogy in 
American Academia, 52 AM. J. COMPo L. 789, 790-93 (2004). Regarding the reductive 
nature of the term "transplant," see notes 55-57 infra and accompanying text. 
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lationship to the law of the Muslim world. 7 Professor Abu Odeh does 
not suggest that Islamic law deserves no study, but that it has been 
transformed in the post colonial era and that its greatly reduced 
scope as the law of Muslim nations, complete with the supposed con­
sequent privatization of religious practice, needs to be accepted and 
incorporated into any proper understanding of "Islamic law."8 
Professor Abu Odeh's contention that medieval doctrine is obso­
lete and not relevant to the lives of contemporary Muslims is in­
sightful and has considerable force. Still, in the post 9/11 world it 
seems quite clear that there is an urgency and importance to under­
standing shari'a in a manner that transcends the nation state and 
that is masked by the preoccupation with classical authorities as the 
expression of contemporary forms of shari'a. The most obvious exam­
ple might be found in the treatment of the rules of jihad,9 which I 
touch upon below only briefly, to frame the problem of the manner in 
which shari'a is approached in the contemporary era. 
In explaining jihad in the modern world, a premier Islamic law 
scholar, Professor Sherman Jackson, treats us to an extensive, 
thoughtful, erudite but ultimately pointless digression into the classi­
cal rules, where the paradigm of jihad was the division of the world 
into an Abode ofWar and an Abode ofIslam, presuming some form of 
eternal hostility on the part of the Muslim world with non-Muslim 
polities.1o The jihad would then take two forms, aggressive, to ex­
pand the Abode of Islam, and defensive, to protect the Abode of Islam 
from attack.ll Jackson insists that the juristic classical division was 
meant more as a description of historical reality, given the nature of 
the empires of the classical era, Muslim and non-Muslim, than a pre­
scription of the Islamic religion.12 
But Professor Jackson needs to provide no explanation for how 
the classical jurists developed the rules that they did in order to en­
lighten us on contemporary ideas of Islam and war because the vast 
majority of modern Muslims do not seem particularly preoccupied by 
7. Id. at 823-24. 
8. Id. 
9. I have selected jihad both because it is an issue of contemporary interest be­
yond the Muslim world and because, as the text makes clear, scholars of the shari'a in 
the contemporary era in the realm of jihad focus extensively on medieval theories 
rather than on what the modern Muslim community demands. It should be noted in 
this light, however, that the term jihad has become a loaded one in our era, and that 
many modern Muslims are quick to point out that the most important form ofjihad is 
the personal form, of a struggle for the purification of the soul. See, e.g., KHALED 
ABOD EL FADL, THE GREAT THEFT 118 (2005). This article focuses on the form ofjihad 
that would be of more interest to jurists and legal scholars; namely, as the articula­
tion of the Muslim law of war. 
10. Sherman Jackson, Jihad and the Modern World, 7 J. ISL. L. & CUL. 1, 10-18 
(2002). 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 18. 
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the classical doctrine. Jackson's misguided focus is best demon­
strated by the following statement, in the midst of his section on the 
classical rules of jihad: 
For our purposes of trying to determine the credibility of the 
claim that Islam is a religion of peace, we may ignore the 
defensive jihad. For no one would accuse Islam, or any other 
religion for that matter, of not being a peaceful religion sim­
ply because it insisted on defending itself. 13 
To ignore defensive jihad is to exalt the historical, classical pa­
rameters ofthe practice ofjihad at the clear expense of current social 
and political reality. The reality is that acts of Muslim aggression 
directed at the West, including those of 9/11, are nearly always justi­
fied in the form of defense, as protection of Muslim lands (or the 
Abode of Islam, if we wish to use the classical terminology) from ex­
ternal aggression. If, in assessing whether or not Islam is a religion of 
peace, we ignore defensive jihad, then we ignore thejihad of the mod­
ern era almost entirely.14 
Examples are replete in modern history. To select but a few, the 
Sudanese Mahdi led an early jihad in the modern era on a largely 
anti-colonial ideology.15 In more contemporary times, Hamas and 
Hezbollah make frequent reference to "occupation" as the raison 
d'etre for their violent activities. 16 The Mghan17 and Iraqi18 jihads 
drew international Muslim support precisely because they were per­
ceived by Muslims to be a form of resistance to foreign occupation and 
aggression. Even Bin Laden refers to the occupation of American 
soldiers in Saudi Arabia, the Zionist incursion on Muslim holy lands, 
and a litany of other activities, all described as acts of unjustifiable 
aggression against Islam, as the basis for hisjihad.l9 Despite the ob­
13. [d. at 16. 
14. To be absolutely clear, my point is not that all violent activities carried on by 
Muslims are truly acts of self-defense, only that they are justified as such. Of course, 
one can, and should, decry some of the horrific and patently aggressive uses to which 
this notion of defensive jihad has been put, but in doing so, and in analyzing and 
understanding jihad in the modern era, it is important to bear in mind that the doc­
trine underlying the activity is one of purported defense, not the expansion of the 
Abode of Islam. 
15. See generally P.M. HOLT, THE MAHDIST STATE IN THE SUDAN 1881-1898: A 
STUDY OF ITS ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND OVERTHROW (1966); FERGUS NICOLL, 
SWORD OF THE PROPHET, THE MAHDI OF THE SUDAN AND THE DEATH OF GENERAL 
GORDON (2004). 
16. See www.moqawama.org (website of Hezbollah, last visited Oct. 30, 2007); 
http://www.alqassam.ps/arabicl?action=US (website of military wing of Hamas, dis­
cussing, among other things, the purpose of its establishment as "building a clear 
political jihad against the occupier") (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
17. DAVID B. EDWARDS, BEFORE TALIBAN: GENEALOGIES OF THE AFGHAN JIHAD 266­
72 (2002). 
18. GEORGE PACKER, THE AsSASSIN'S GATE 308-12 (2005). 
19. See, e.g., PETER BERGEN, THE OSAMA BIN LADEN I KNow 164-65 (2005) ("It 
should not be hidden from you that the people of Islam have suffered from aggression, 
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vious differences among these various movements,20 all of them 
claimed to be acting in defense. If the expansionist paradigm held as 
much interest among contemporary Muslims as it seems to among 
scholars ofIslam and the polemicists decried by them,21 then it would 
have much easier, for example, for Bin Laden to justify his attacks on 
that basis. The fact that he chooses not to, whether out of conviction 
or in order to entice Muslims to his side, is extremely telling. 
As a result, the broad fabric of activities that are justified under 
the rubric of jihad do not call upon the classical paradigm in any 
meaningful manner. They are not claimed to be an aggressive at­
tempt to convert the West. Moreover, they look less like even the 
defensive form of classical jihad, of a sudden attack on a unified Mus­
lim polity under the leadership of a caliph that requires an immedi­
ate military response,22 to a gamut of circumstances that are 
uniquely modern, involving ideas that are rooted in self-determina­
tion, regional liberation and anti-colonial fervor. 
Professor Jackson defends his project of linking the modern 
world to the classical rules on the basis of a crucial assumption. This 
assumption, shared by wide portions of the academy seeking to res­
cue the classical project as relevant to the modern era, relies on a 
thoroughly conventional division of modern Islam into two broad cat­
egories, that of traditionalism and that of fundamentalism. 23 The 
former, in the words of two premier Islamic law scholars in the 
United States, are composed of elements in society that are "socially 
and politically conservative, seeking individual piety and social mo­
res built around traditional compliance with fiqh (traditional classi­
cal legal doctrine) and look to social and political improvements 
mainly as a result ofthat."24 The fundamentalists are in theory polit­
ical in their nature and prefer to develop their ideas through novel 
interpretations of foundational text; namely, the Qur'an, and 
Muhammad's statements or utterances, known as the hadith.25 
Thus, the traditionalists concern themselves with classical doctrine, 
and the fundamentalists do not. The traditionalists are not con­
cerned with the exercise of executive authority, and the fundamental-
iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-CIUsader alliance and their 
collaborators to the extent that the Muslims' blood became the cheapest and their 
wealth as loot in the hands of the enemies."). 
20. The use of jihad to justifY a wide litany of modern activities ranging from 
national liberation to anti-colonialism to global terrorism is a fascinating one that lies 
well beyond the purview of this Article. Suffice it to say for purposes of this Article, 
whatever the underlying premise, those engaging injihad in the modern world nearly 
always claim to be acting in self-defense. 
21. See Jackson, supra note 10, at 2 (describing such polemics). 
22. See MAJID KHAnDuRI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 86, 94 (1955). 
23. Roy, supra note 2, at 37-39; Jackson, supra note 10, at 5-6; Shari'a, supra note 
2, at 92. 
24. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 77 n.2. 
25. Roy, supra note 2, at 37-39. 
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ists are obsessed with controlling the state. The traditionalists, it 
might be said, represent the law, and the fundamentalists represent 
politics. 
The contention is that the juristic law of the traditionalists has 
remained for the entire modern era to some extent insulated from the 
politics ofthe fundamentalists, as well as, of course, from other politi­
cal and ideological movements in the nation states of the Muslim 
world. As stated in a more extreme fashion by Professor Jackson in 
another work, while fundamentalist movements might have an 
"enormous impact in social, political, cultural, and other contexts ... 
little of this is reflected in the manuals of Islamic law."26 Thus, Is­
lamic fundamentalists might succeed in upending a regime and re­
placing it with their own, defined Islamic alternative, or in 
conducting their own forms of jihad divorced from historical rules 
and based on novel interpretations offoundational text, but the tradi­
tionalists' projection ofthe classical law will remain substantially un­
affected by this process. Hence, for example, one leading scholar can 
admit that there are contemporary political problems with the imple­
mentation of democratic rule in Muslim countries, and then propose 
to ignore those entirely and focus his work instead on "doctrinal" 
questions relating to democracy, which involve the interpretation of 
foundational text and centuries old classical exegeses, as if the doc­
trine developed therefrom remains pristine and unaffected by the po­
litical situation that renders democracy so difficult.27 The law, in 
other words, is safely separable from the poisonous politics of our 
era.28 
26. Shari'a, supra note 2, at 94. See also VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 27 n.2 
(suggesting marginal influence offundamentalist trends on Islamic finance outside of 
Iran). 
27. KHALED ABou EL FADL, ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY 4 (2004). 
28. It is ironic that Professor Jackson would come to such an odd conclusion, 
given his admirable efforts at using approaches characteristic of the American Legal 
Realists in his examination, in the premodern era, of the shari'a. In some of his com­
parative work, Professor Jackson refers to the work of Professors Roberto Unger and 
Stanley Fish extensively to suggest that the classical rules are not logical interpreta­
tions offoundational text but rather, that classical legal theory was a means by which 
classical jurists could "authenticate" particular meanings of foundational text that 
suited them and that they then could defend through accepted rhetorical tools and 
devices. Sherman A. Jackson, Fiction and Formalism: Toward a Functional Analysis 
ofUsul al Fiqh, in STUDIES IN ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORY 195-96 (Bernard G. Weiss ed., 
2002). Elsewhere Professor Jackson suggests that this quest for validation and au­
thority in legal rulings is in fact the reason for the fabled "closing of the doors" of 
ijtihad, or interpretive effort. Shari'a, supra note 2, at 90-93. The closing of the doors 
did not therefore prevent creative reasoning to legal solutions but merely required 
jurists to purport to rely on earlier jurists to defend their conclusions on legal ques­
tions, often manipulating the positions of the earlier jurists to justify their rulings. 
Professor Jackson compares this to the work of Alan Watson, and adopts Professor 
Watson's term "legal scaffolding" to explain it. [d. at 91. 
It is therefore to Professor Jackson's credit that he has played an early, important role 
in debunking the notion that classical doctrine is the result of the strict application of 
interpretive rules to foundational text, divorced from the context in which the process 
431 2008] MUEZZIN'S CALL AND THE DOW .JONES BELL 
Professor Abu Odeh mentions the fundamentalist/traditionalist 
dichotomy almost in passing,29 but it seems that in some ways her 
position benefits from its existence because it masks the underlying 
problem with her position. That is, Professor Abu Odeh's assault on 
one scholar's argument respecting the possible compatibility of con­
stitutionalism (she could have also added democracy)30 with classical 
doctrine is generally sound and correct.31 Muslims, just like anyone 
else, invent a past to accord with and validate their own ideological 
visions, and the idea that events and theorists of the premodern era 
actually control anything in the contemporary world is an illusory 
one. 
However, Professor Abu Odeh seems to be denying what appears 
manifest to many of us; namely, that a generalized pan-national no­
tion of shari'a has become deeply relevant in the modern Muslim 
world. In the context of jihad, the notion of Islamically inspired vio­
lence perpetrated by non-state actors enjoys widespread support (fi­
nancial, material, spiritual and otherwise) across the Muslim world, 
even with respect to conflicts that are confined to nation states.32 
The international dimension of the Iraqi and Afghan jihads is one 
example.33 As another, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 
which is composed of fifty-six majority Muslim states, has sought to 
define terrorism in a manner that specifically excludes the "resis­
tance" of the openly Islamist militant groups Hamas and Hezbol­
lah.34 A set of pan-national norms does seem to be developing that 
both claims its legitimacy at least partially on Islamic grounds and 
unfolds. Nevertheless, because Professor Jackson's focus has largely been in the 
premodern era, his ideas respecting modern Islamic doctrine and its relationship to 
the classical law seem contradictory and incomplete. Surely, if the classical theorists 
simply used earlier jurists to validate their own rulings, developed on the basis of 
their own ideological and ethical biases, modern jurists could as simply authenticate 
their own meanings to earlier rulings. These modernists would then suggest that 
they are remaining faithful to classical principles for the purpose of validation while 
adopting, modifYing and distinguishing them to such a degree over the past several 
centuries as to render the original opinions, developed by jurists in vastly different 
social, political and economic circumstances from modern Muslims, entirely irrele­
vant for all purposes but the rhetorical. It seems that using the techniques Professor 
Jackson espouses, the conclusion would be that historical classical doctrine is of no 
moment in approaching contemporary understandings of the shari'a and we in the 
academy should not be paying as much attention to it as we do. 
29. See Abu Odeh, supra note 6, at 806. 
30. See generally ABou EL FADL, supra note 27. 
31. Abu Odeh, supra note 6, at 808-13. 
32. This is not to suggest that every contemporary example ofjihad is necessarily 
pan-national, only that a significant and arguably growing number of modern jihads, 
including the most widely known and publicized, have an international dimension 
that can scarcely be gainsaid. 
33. See supra notes 17 and 18 and accompanying references. 
34. Kuala Lumpur Declaration on International Terrorism, arts. 10-12, Apr. 3, 
2002, OIC, available at http://www.oic-oci.org/englishlconflfm/l1_extraordinarY/decla­
ration.htm [hereinafter "Kuala Lumpur Declaration"]. 
•
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that is growing to some extent distinct from the international legal 
position on the relationship between resistance, jihad and terrorism. 
The vast popularity of these ideas in the Muslim world can 
hardly be denied. If Islam has been as privatized and compartmen­
talized into nation states as Professor Abu Odeh indicates, and the 
national civil code is the authority to which we must turn in evaluat­
ing Islam and law in our times, then the vast and disturbing popular­
ity of Osama Bin Laden in Jordan, where a clear majority of the 
population as late as 2005 expressed support for him, would be very 
difficult to rationalize or explain.35 
It seems that there is a broad, cacophonous, yet ideologically co­
hesive pan-national movement, or more properly, series of move­
ments, in the Muslim world that has advocated specific ideas of 
jihad, called for an independent form of economics and commerce, 
sought to redefine the role ofwomen in the social order, and created, 
or attempted to create, political revolution in the various nation 
states of the Muslim world that has had drastic legal consequences 
where successful, all in the name of Islam. In some cases, such as the 
infusion of notions of social justice into matters of commerce, ele­
ments of the various movements may be quite salutary. Other ele­
ments have proven much less so. The revival has in its turn spawned 
a number of pan-national Islamic countercultures, drawing on their 
own versions of Islam and Islamicity that merit study, from Fatima 
Mernissi's revolutionary ideas on the potentially expansive rights of 
women in an Islamic paradigm36 to Abdullahi An-Nairn's notion that 
the shari'a is not and was never intended to be a legal code.37 
Inasmuch, however, as the entire pan-national epiphenomenon 
can be dismissed as fundamentalist and political or a reaction 
thereto, divorced from "true" shari'a, which is the jurists' law of the 
medieval era, then it might plausibly be claimed that this is merely 
politics, bearing no relationship to the shari'a, or the manner in 
which it should be approached. On the other hand, if the epiphenom­
enon relates to an understanding of Islam and law in the modern era, 
in the law of war, in commercial transactions, in defining the role of 
women, in setting criminal punishment for particular activity, then it 
seems that nothing could be more important than understanding this 
Muslim law, or series oflegal ideas, teaching it in our law schools and 
drawing comparisons to other laws and legal systems. Those legal 
ideas and the reactions they have spawned, entirely divorced from 
classical doctrine and separate from, although related to, the laws of 
the Muslim nations, surely deserve our attention. 
35. Pew Research Center Poll (July 15, Z003), available at http://pewglobal.org/ 
reports/display.php?ReportID=Z48 (showing popularity ratings for Bin Laden in Jor­
dan and Pakistan at 60% and 51%, respectively, in the summer of Z005). 
36. See generally, e.g., FATIMA MERNISSI, BEYOND THE VEIL (Zd ed. 1987). 
37. See infra note 4Z. 
2008] MUEZZIN'S CALL AND THE DOW JONES BELL 433 
In fact, there is much reason to doubt the reductive division of 
traditionalism and fundamentalism, Islamic law and Islamic politics, 
and the dismissal of the latter as not truly legal. While purported 
adherence to classical rules remains, and Professor Jackson is cer­
tainly right that purported reliance on classical authority is an excel­
lent means by which an interpretation might gain legitimacy,38 the 
independent revolutionary interpretations of the revivalist move­
ments that Professor Jackson refers to as "fundamentalist" have had 
a profound impact on how the classical authorities are understood, 
even by the least revolutionary and most conservative traditionalists. 
Traditionalism is, as a result, no less modern and no more authentic 
as an expression of Islamicity than fundamentalism. 
The fallacy of the formalist position respecting a division be­
tween historical traditionalist Islamic law and modern, fundamental­
ist Islamic politics is particularly obvious in the context of Islamic 
finance. Frank Vogel and Samuel Hayes, who have written the au­
thoritative work on the subject in the English language, seem content 
to accept the practice ofIslamic finance on its own terms, as a faithful 
extension of classical era doctrine. The retort seems to have come 
from recently from Mahmoud El-Gamal, who has provided us with a 
case for how Islamic finance currently adheres largely to the "letter" 
of the classical rules but can violate its "spirit," which Professor El­
Gamal seeks to identify through his own analysis of classical authori­
ties.39 Unfortunately, however, the ascertainment of the spirit of 
classical law is as vain an enterprise as the ascertainment of its 
letter. 
In addition, in the context of finance, the influence of fundamen­
talist politics on the core doctrine of the shari'a is clear and obvious. 
The prominent Islamic revivalists of the last century, who called for 
economic transformation of Muslim societies in a manner that would 
both resist dominant conceptions of economic order and supposedly 
achieve economic and social justice and mutuality in economic trans­
actions, have proven too compelling for Islamic finance to resist in 
any sort of overt fashion. 40 This conception of Islam in the realm of 
economics, as consumed with social justice and fairness in contradis­
tinction to the perceived rapacious and exploitative West, has become 
profoundly popular as a form of protest against the postcolonial eco­
nomic, social and political order. It is thus a form of economic "resis­
tance," to complement the political form of resistance that manifests 
itself in the contemporary doctrine of jihad. 
38. See supra note 28 and accompanying references. 
39. MAHMOUD EL-GAMAL, ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS AND PRACTICE 52-63 
(2006). 
40. See infra Section N. 
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The other influence on contemporary commercial shari'a doctrine 
is the reality of global economic order, which tends to regard such 
ideas of confrontation with the West somewhat frightfully if taken 
seriously. This also has had a significant impact on the development 
and evolution of shari'a in the modern era. In the commercial and 
financial context, it is to be expected that large financial institutions 
like HSBC or Citibank would be perfectly happy to make very limited 
and modest adjustments to the form of their financial transactions to 
enter an entirely untapped market, but the idea that they would ac­
cept the characterization of loans as exploitative and agree to share 
in risks and rewards across their portfolio in the manner envisaged 
by the early Islamic revolutionaries is preposterous. A Muslim soci­
ety seeking to engage large financial institutions will have to face 
these realities. Given that any Muslim society, no matter how 
overtly revolutionary, recognizes the need for some level of global en­
gagement if it wishes to be politically and economically relevant in 
the modern era, broad interaction with the giants of international fi­
nance is inevitable. 
The doctrine ofIslamic finance thus is entirely contemporary and 
owes nothing but its terminology to the classical era. It is the mani­
festation of a continuing mediation of these two broad, opposing influ­
ences, of a resistance based desire for "Islamic economic justice" on 
the one hand and a power based necessary involvement in the global 
commercial and financial markets on the other. 
III. CLASSICAL NOTIONS OF COMMERCIAL ORDER 
A. Structural Pluralism in the Classical Paradigm 
In order to understand the flaws in the paradigm that connects 
the rules of Islamic finance to the classical era in some sort of harmo­
nious fashion unaffected by the politics of the day, it is important to 
review briefly both the structure of classical era doctrine as well as 
the rules developed to govern various aspects of commerce. 
As to structure, any survey of the rich and varied history of class­
ical shari'a will be by necessity narrow and reductive. Not only must 
such a survey span more than a millennium of legal thought, but the 
very nature of the classical shari'a defies simple categorization. The 
means by which the shari'a was developed was largely casuistic, with 
jurists from primarily four schools of thought41 working through hy­
pothetical situations on the basis of their interpretations of founda­
tional texts (and the use of other accepted interpretive techniques, 
most prominently qiyas, a form of reasoning largely analogical in na­
41. Other schools existed, among them the literalist Zahiri and the smaller and 
more marginal Daudi, Thawri and Auzai, but ultimately the four that remained 
throughout the classical era were the Hanbali, the Hanafi, the Maliki and the Shafi'i. 
JACKSON, infra note 212, at xxvi. 
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ture) and often disagreeing with one another as to outcome.42 The 
result is a multiplicity of conclusions among jurists defying easy cate­
gorization or analysis, which I refer to herein as "structural 
pluralism." 
This concept of structural pluralism constitutes an essential 
problem in making faithfulness to classical doctrine the yardstick 
against which Islamicity is measured. While structural pluralism 
may have served the shari'a well in the context of empire, quite obvi­
ously it is not the manner in which a nation state operates, where 
there is an expectation of uniformity of result (either throughout the 
state, or, if a federal state, within each given substate region). 
That these notions have been fully incorporated into contempo­
rary Muslim understandings of legal authority is amply demon­
strated by the willingness of nearly all Muslim nations, even those 
purported to be governed by shari'a, to accept the principle of nullum 
crimen /nulla poena sine lege,43 despite the fact that within the class­
ical paradigm this was a meaningless concept. Structural pluralism 
obviously precludes the possibility of explicit authoritative texts 
clearly defining criminal activity in every possible instance. Founda­
tional text provides clarity in some cases, but only for the small num­
ber of crimes discussed therein.44 Therefore, for the wide variety of 
"discretionary" crimes known as the ta'zir, there was no concept of 
nullum crimen / nulla poena.45 
Contemporary scholars will often point, among other things, to 
Quranic verse indicating that God has never punished a community 
prior to sending that community an Apostle to warn them as "prov­
ing" that nulla poena / nullum crimen are in fact Islamic norms. 46 
42. Abdullahi An-Naim, Shari'a and Positive Legislation: Is an Islamic State Pos­
sible or Viable?, in 5 YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE EASTERN LAw 29-42 (Eugene 
Cotran & Chibli Mallat eds., 1999). 
43. 2 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW, 4153 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 
2005) (Status of Ratification Chart); Kenneth Gallant, The Principle of Legality in 
International and Comparative Criminal Law: A Partial History to World War II 
(Chapter 2), 6 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.comJso13/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=997473 (u . .. Islamic countries generally do not object to international obligations 
concerning non-retroactivity of criminal law."). 
44. MATTHEW LIPPMAN ET AL., ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 45-52 
(1988) (describing the very limited set of crimes defined explicitly in foundational 
text). 
45. Id. at 52-53. Cf Ghaouti Benhelma, Ta'zir Crimes, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 213 (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 1982) (arguing that the practice of ta'zir 
was consistent with the principle of nulla poena / nullum crimen, but acknowledging 
levels of judicial discretion that are plainly inconsistent with contemporary under­
standings of nulla poena/nullum crimen). 
46. THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 45, at 25; Taymour Kamel, 
The Principle ofLegality and Its Application in Islamic Criminal Justice, in THE Is­
LAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 45, at 158. See also Quran 17:15 (stating 
that God does not punish "until we have sent a Messenger"), 35:25 (stating that 
"Every nation has had its Messenger raised up to warn them ..."). 
•
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However, this is both ahistorical and largely beside the point, in that 
it neither reflects classical attitudes towards the ta'zir, nor does the 
verse, which has to do with telling a community that there is a God to 
whom they owe obedience, relate to what to do with an individual 
who has violated some sort of community norm but not in a manner 
that clearly violates a text, for example, an eyewitness who has per­
jured himself but not in the context of certain proceedings specified in 
the Qur'an for which there is an established punishment.47 
The point of this discussion is not to disparage the contemporary 
interpretations or the largely salutary efforts of quasi-historical 
story-telling to reach a result with which few in the modern world 
would take issue. Professor Feldman is right to dismiss this sort of 
disparagement and focus instead on whether contemporary Muslims 
accept the doctrinal evolution.48 However, given the widely held be­
lief that Islam is captive to the rules of the classical world, it is worth 
pointing out at every possible opportunity that this is hardly true. 
This acceptance of the modern paradigm respecting the uniform­
ity and predictability of law despite its considerable variance from 
the assumptions of the functions of law in the classical era should 
alone lead to an almost immediate dismissal of all classical doctrine 
as largely useless to the modern world, too prone to manipulation to 
be able to be made sense of and therefore not the source of modern 
rules. A modern legal code cannot truly be made from hundreds of 
contradictory juristic texts spanning over a thousand years, particu­
larly when, as in matters of commerce and finance, the texts deal 
largely with material that is either irrelevant or deeply offensive to 
modern sensibilities, such as debates over whether a stipulation re­
quiring a female slave to be a virgin is permissible because virginity 
is for the buyer a characteristic of the item sold and not a separate 
stipulation to the added advantage of the buyer.49 
Abdullahi An Nairn has seized on contradictions and anachro­
nisms of this sort to make the bold and thoughtful claim that the 
shari'a is not and was never intended to be "law" but rather a set of 
nonbinding norms. 50 Compelling as I find An Nairn's claim, I do not 
wish to burden this paper with questions of the true nature of the 
shari'a as legal or moral. Instead, I only point out that, whatever 
classical doctrine is, it is not anything resembling a modern legal 
code or even a relatively uniform set of principles to use in a given 
industry, such as finance, and that any attempt to impose such rela­
tive uniformity is one that will be so mired in ideological and ethical 
choice as not to be taken seriously as a neutral effort to "modernize" 
47. See Benhelma, supra note 45, at 216-17 (using false testimony as an example 
of a ta'zir crime). 
48. NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD 72 (2003) 
49. SANHURl, infra note 60, at 102 (quoting Kasanil. 
50. See An-Nairn, supra note 42. 
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classical thought. Rather, any such endeavor will be the creation of 
new rules using old terminology. 
Nevertheless, the general belief appears to be that Islamic classi­
cal doctrine, disparate and pluralistic as it may be, does have some 
sort of ascertainable, neutral core, though clearly it could be manipu­
lated by selectively applying the "wrong" rules.51 If this is so, then 
there is a correct way of modernizing classical doctrine to remain 
faithful to the past, and an incorrect way. Indeed, much ink seems to 
have been spilled in service of finding the correct way. This usually 
involves locating the "spirit,"52 "internallogic,"53 or "underlying prin­
ciples"54 of the disparate classical exegeses, and from them develop­
ing rules, either through literalist selection of those rules that 
harmonize with the "internal logic," "spirit" or "underlying princi­
ples," as the case may be, or by drafting entirely new legislation in 
broad harmony therewith. 
The great Arab lawyer and Dean of Cairo University Faculty of 
Law and later Baghdad Law School, Abdul Razzaq al-Sanhuri, 
claimed to have adopted such an Islamic approach in developing civil 
codes for Egypt and Iraq that have become the templates for the civil 
codes of nearly all Arab nations, the "transplant" to which Professor 
Abu Odeh shows such fealty.55 In contrast to Professor Abu Odeh, 
Dean Sanhuri did not describe his own work as a transplant, at least 
at times. Rather, he was certainly known to have taken the position 
that his civil code was not an import from abroad, but rather the 
modernization of the classical shari'a, derived through a process of 
discovering its principles through extensive comparative study and 
then using those principles to draft legislation in conformity there­
with.56 The fact that many of provisions were clearly taken from 
51. EL-GAMAL, supra note 39, at 53; LOMBARDI, supra note 4, at 82; VOGEL & 
HAYES, supra note 2, at 37-38. 
52. EL-GAMAL, supra note 39, at 53. 
53. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 37-38. 
54. LOMBARDI, supra note 4, at 94-96. 
55. Id. at 98; ENID HILL, AL-SANHURI AND ISLAMIC LAW 68-70 (1987). Respecting 
Dean Sanhuri's regional influence, see Abdullah An-Na'im, The Foundations of Law: 
Globalization and Jurisprudence, an Islamic Law Perspective, 54 EMORY L.J. 25,47 
(2005). As any common lawyer in the early 19th century would naturally have a copy 
of Blackstone's Commentaries by his side, so it is inconceivable that an Arab lawyer 
working in most of the Arab countries of the Middle East would not refer with respect 
to any legal question concerning interpretation of the civil code to Sanhuri's multi­
volume AL-WASIT, which functions effectively as his commentaries on the Egyptian 
Civil Code. See, e.g., W. M. BALLANTYNE, ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES ON ARAB LAWS 79 
(2000). 
56. HILL, supra note 55, at 68-70; LOMBARDI, supra note 4, at 98. Even Professor 
Abu Odeh has noted this point in some of her work. See, e.g., Lama Abu Odeh, Mod­
ernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case ofEgypt, 37 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 1043, 1093-94 
(2004). 
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Western civil codes did not lead Dean Sanhuri to conclude that it 
lacked Islamicity given the methodology employed to derive it.57 
By contrast, others in search of the classical spirit have implied 
that an approach that so closely resembles Western notions of com­
merce is in fact violative of Islamic law's "internal logic." They sug­
gest that contemporary Islamic finance is more in conformity with 
that internal logic. 58 One recent scholar argues that neither of these 
is entirely correct and that, at least with respect to certain classical 
prohibitions, the purpose and spirit is to preserve Pareto-efficiency.59 
That such great minds can come to such disparate conclusions about 
the true spirit and logic of the classical law should demonstrate am­
ply that this search for underlying principles and spirit is a hopeless 
exercise in transcendental nonsense, but nevertheless, the quest ap­
pears to continue. 
The following sections provide a highly generalized summary of 
three select prohibitions of the classical era, identified by Dean 
Sanhuri as particularly problematic in modern times,60 in order to 
provide a more concrete and specific demonstration of the considera­
ble distance between classical doctrine and the reality of Islamic 
finance. 
B. Contract and Stipulation 
In the classical era, there was no general theory of contract or 
obligation.61 Thus, for example, classical jurists discuss specific 
types of contracts, among them contracts of sale, leaselhire, agency 
and partnership, without providing a general, underlying theory re­
57. Nevertheless, the resemblance to the European civil codes did provoke a fairly 
involved scholarly debate on whether or not the civil code was truly Islamic. HILL, 
supra note 55, at 71-83 (describing the scholarly debate at length and taking the posi­
tion that the civil code was in fact more Islamic than is commonly believed). Cf J. N. 
D. Anderson, The Shari'a and the Civil Code, 1 IsL. L. Q. 29-46 (1954). For a contem­
porary contribution, see Amr Shalakany, Between Identity and Redistribution: 
Sanhuri, Genealogy and the Will to Islamise, ISL. L. & Soc. 201 (2001). 
58. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 38. 
59. EL-GAMAL, supra note 39, at 53. A Pareto-efficient transaction is one in which 
at least one of the parties to the transaction is better off, and the other is at least no 
worse off as a result of the transaction. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, 
AMERICAN LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 454 (2005). 
60. 3 ABDUL RAZZAQ AL SANHURI, MASADIRAL-HAQQ FI AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI, DlRASA 
MUQARINA MA' AL-FIQH AL-GHARBI [The Sources of Authority in Islamic Jurispru­
dence: A Comparative Study with Western Jurisprudence] 14 (1967). 
61. JOSEPH SCHACHT, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAw 144 (1979) ("Islamic law does 
not recognize the liberty of contract, but it provides an appreciable measure of free­
dom within certain fixed types."); N.J. COULSON, COMMERCIAL LAw IN THE GULF 
STATES: THE ISLAMIC LEGAL TRADITION 17 (1984). See also Hussein Hassan, Contracts 
in Islamic Law: The Principles of Commutative Justice and Liberality, 13:3 J. IsL. 
STUD. 257, 258-61 (2002) (accepting the conclusions of Schacht and Coulson that Is­
lamic law had no general theory of contract but taking issue with their conclusion 
that Islamic law recognized no freedom to contract). 
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specting them.62 The first significant codification of the shari'a, the 
Ottoman Majalla, repeated this shortcoming, which led Dean 
Sanhuri to attempt to discover, from his "scientific" perusal of the 
classical authorities, a series of underlying principles for a more gen­
eral theory.63 Quite fortunately, this process led Dean Sanhuri to 
conclude that the shari'a in fact largely replicates Roman law on the 
subject, thereby justifying his wholesale adoption of European civil 
code provisions as concerns much of the law of contract.64 
Unlike Dean Sanhuri, the classical authorities that he claims to 
channel in transforming shari'a into something strongly resembling 
European civil law were not at all concerned with a general theory of 
obligation. They did debate fiercely, however, in a manner that West­
ern lawyers would no doubt find baffiing,65 the extent to which con­
tracts of the nominate forms could be combined or altered through 
the use of what are known as stipulations (shurutJ, such as a sale of 
an animal on condition that it be brought to a particular location.66 
The classical ruminations are far too complex and rich to discuss 
competently in this Article,67 but some generalizations can be made. 
First, it is clear that any stipulations that vary a requirement of the 
contract (muqtadha al-aqid) are void. For example, a contract of sale 
requires the immediate granting of the item purchased, thus a stipu­
lation that delays the transfer ofthe item until the death of a particu­
lar person cannot be made.68 On the other hand, stipulations that 
either reinforce the contract requirements, such as that a buyer own 
the property she is selling, or harmonize with them, such as that the 
buyer post security for her purchase, are generally valid.69 
62. COULSON, supra note 61, at 19; VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 97-98; Sana 
Habachy, The System ofNullities in Muslim Law, 13 AM. J. COMPo L. 61, 63; Hussein, 
supra note 61, at 258 n.6. Numerous classical references make this abundantly clear, 
as the nominate forms of agreements are discussed therein in vastly different parts of 
the classical exegeses of most jurists, with seemingly nothing connecting them. See, 
e.g., IBN QUDAMA, MUGHNI (1986) 6:5 (book of sales), 7:109 (book of partnerships), 
8:5(book of leases); KAsANI, BADA'I AL-SANA'I (1968) 6:2983 (book of sales), 10:4980 
(book of loans), 5:2554 (book of leases); SARAKHSI, MABsUT (1993) 12:108 (book of 
sales), 22:17 (book of passive partnerships); 15:74 (book ofleases). 
63. HILL, supra note 55, at 45-46. 
64. [d. at 78-79. 
65. The shurut have no analogy in Western law, simply because a general theory 
of obligation, of the sort that most modern legal systems have, makes limitations on 
the promises one can make through a doctrine of stipulations entirely senseless. That 
is, once a legal system permits promises to be made and enforced as a general matter, 
there is no need to restrict stipulations that might condition these promises. In the 
medieval system, however, where no general theory of obligation exists, a doctrine of 
stipulations prevents contracts of the acceptable nominate forms from deviating 
widely from those nominate forms through the inclusion of additional stipulations or 
conditions. 
66. SANHURI, supra note 60, at 101-05. 
67. For a more complete discussion in Arabic, see id. at 101-33. 
68. [d. at 101-02. 
69. [d. at 106-08 (quoting a series of classical authorities, among them Sarakhsi, 
Kasani and Ibn QudamahJ. See also VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 101. 
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Most disputes concerned concomitant stipulations that did not 
derogate from the basic contract requirements or reinforce them, but 
rather inserted a provision to the favor of one party or the other, such 
as the seller of a house agreeing to transfer title on condition that he 
have the right to marry the daughter of the buyer, or the buyer of 
cloth agreeing to purchase the cloth on condition that the seller sew a 
shirt from it. 70 There are different degrees of permission granted to 
these sorts of stipulations depending on the school of thought. 71 
The most liberal school with respect to stipulations is the 
Hanbali school, which permits them unless they contradict the re­
quirements of the contract or violate a provision ofthe shari'a, among 
them, a statement by Muhammad accepted as valid by the Hanbalis 
that prohibits more than one stipulation in a contract of sale. 72 
Hanbali scholars made a point of distinguishing themselves on the 
basis of the "two stipulations" rule, arguing that a single stipulation 
in a sale was never intended to be a violation of the shari'a and that, 
contrary to the position of the other schools, Muhammad never for­
bade a single stipulation.73 
Ibn Taymiyya, a late theorist from the Hanbali school, joined in 
this debate on behalf of his school, arguing, as the Hanbalis before 
him, that Muhammad never banned a single stipulation in a con­
tract. 74 He further indicated that the true Hanbali position was that 
any stipulation that was not either a direct violation of a shari'a pro­
vision or a strict analogy derived therefrom was permissible. 75 Thus, 
for example, a seller of a slave could reserve some of the slave's ser­
vice for himself in the context of a sale. 76 
Ibn Taymiyya is also very clear that stipulations that are made 
in violation of the shari'a, or as a means to circumvent the shari'a, 
are invalid, and he absolutely includes within this category the prohi­
bition on two stipulations in a sale or a loan combined with a sale. He 
indicates as follows: 
And thus has it been proven that the Apostle of God, may 
peace and blessings be upon him, as reported by Abdullah 
70. SANHURI, supra note 60, at at 102. See also VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 
101. 
71. SANHURI, supra note 60, at 156-72. 
72. Id. at 163-67. 
73. IBN QUDAMA, supra note 62, at 2:165-66 ("And as for our view ... it is not 
correct that the Prophet forbade a sale with a stipulation, but what is correct is that 
he forbade two stipulations in a sale .... And this leads to the understanding that a 
single stipulation is permissible. And Ahmed [ibn Hanbal, the eponym of the Hanbali 
school] has said 'the prohibition is on two stipulations in a sale."'). 
74. IBN TAYMIYYA, FATAWA 3:473 (1966). 
75. Id. at 3:474. 
76. Id. 
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Ibn Omar, has said that a loan with a sale is prohibited and 
a sale with two stipulations is prohibited ....77 
As is set forth in greater detail in Part IV infra, this statement 
has been conveniently ignored in the modern era, not only by Islamic 
financiers but also in the first modern codification of the shari'a, the 
nineteenth century Ottoman Majalla. 78 
C. Gharar 
The classical doctrine ofgharar prohibits certain types of specu­
lation and risk in contracts. While contracts, even in the medieval 
era necessarily involve some level of uncertainty, classical jurists de­
termined that certain levels of uncertainty were of the type that 
would void a contract, largely on the basis of Prophetic statements 
forbidding the sale of unripe fruit on a tree, the sperm of a stallion, 
the fetus of a camel, grapes until they are black, or grain until it is 
strong.79 Given the inherent arbitrariness of any line to be drawn 
between acceptable levels of speculative uncertainty and unaccept­
able levels, combined with differences among the schools of thought 
concerning the matter ofgharar, generalizations are difficult to make 
without extensive exposition.80 
Nevertheless, at least two central fundamental principles involv­
ing gharar can be identified. First, there is a prohibition on the sale 
of an item not currently in existence.8 ! Second, the doctrine bans all 
significant uncertainties inherent to the performance af a contract by 
either party, such as any uncertainty over cost or duration.82 There 
are disputes within the schools about whether or not these rules 
would apply to gifts as well as sales, with some Maliki jurists permit­
ting gifts that have large uncertainties in value.83 
There are two exceptions to these fundamental principles, one 
developed as a result of a contradictory statement of Muhammad, 
77. Id. at 3:419. 
78. See OUSSSAMA ARABI, STUDIES IN MODERN ISLAMIC LAw AND JURISPRUDENCE 
39 (2001). 
79. IBN RUSHD, BIDAYAT AL-MuJTAHID 3:1607-08 (1995). 
80. See generally SANHURI, supra note 60, at 13-56 (discussing varying rules of 
gharar among the competing schools of thought). 
81. See IBN RUSHD, BIDAYAT AL-MUJTAHID 3:1610 (1970) ("thus all of the jurists 
have agreed on the prohibition of [the sale of fruit prior to its appearance], because it 
is the sale of an item that has not been created"); SANHURI, supra note 60, at 3:31 
("and thus we find that there is a consensus among the schools of thought that if an 
object is not present at the time of contracting, then the contract is void even if its 
presence can be established in the future."); VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 91. 
82. See SANHURI, supra note 60, at 3:49. Thus, a price pegged to a varying index 
or a lease contract that imposes largely unknown liabilities on a lessee fall well within 
the bounds ofprohibitedgharar in Islamic finance. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, 
at 93, 144, at least with respect to contracts that are not gratuitous in nature. 
83. IBN RUSHD, supra note 81, at 2:361 ("all which cannot be sold legitimately 
from the standpoint of gharar [may be gifted]"). 
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and another available in the Hanafi school of thought, which, depend­
ing on how seriously they are taken, can do considerable violence to 
the principles described above. As to the first, advance purchases, 
known as salam, were permitted as established by Prophetic state­
ment of permissibility, so long as they did not pertain to particular 
objects but rather were generic or abstract sales.84 The delivery of 
cash for the purchase had to be immediate. A bilateral executory con­
tract where the seller agreed to purchase at a later date and the 
buyer agreed to buy at that date was not valid.85 The second excep­
tion related to a concept known as istisna, pursuant to which parties 
contract for the manufacture of particular goods, which obviously 
would not be in existence at the time that the contract is formed.86 
D. Riba 
The prohibition on riba in the classical era had much less to do 
with interest on loans than with types of prohibited trades, based on 
the following statement of Muhammad: 
Gold for gold, like for like, hand to hand and any excess is 
riba. Silver for silver, like for like, hand to hand and any 
excess is riba; grain for grain, like for like, hand to hand and 
any excess is riba; salt for salt, like for like, hand to hand 
and any excess is riba; barley for barley, like for like, hand to 
hand, and any excess is riba, dates for dates, like for like, 
hand to hand, and any excess is riba. And if the kinds differ, 
then sell as you wish, so long as it is hand to hand.87 
This statement creates two categories of riba, one in which cer­
tain hand to hand (i.e., simultaneous) transactions result in a mate­
rial gain for one party, and one in which a transaction results in 
delayed receipt on the part of one party. On its terms, it only applies 
with respect to six items, and even then, insofar as trades in excess 
amounts is concerned, only to trade within any particular item. Yet 
classical jurists, using a form of analogical reasoning known as qiyas, 
expanded this into a bewildering array of prohibitions of trade de­
pending on the nature of the items being traded. Thus, for example, 
one school of thought created classifications based on the six items 
above relating to whether or not a particular commodity was weigh­
able or measurable at time of sale, while others created classifica­
84. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 89. Thus, for example, the purchase at 
present of a certain number of bushels of wheat was permitted, but not wheat from a 
particular field. [d. Other rules also existed, requiring precise specifications on 
weight and type, for example. SANHURr, supra note 60, at 3:34. 
85. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 89. 
86. SANHURI, supra note 60, at 3:38; KAsANr, BADA'r AL-SANA'r 7:2167-69 (1968). 
87. MUHAMMAD IBN IDRIS, Al-Shafi'i, AL-RrsALA 'll'll 43-47 (1940); SARAKHsr, MAE· 
SUT 12:110 (1993); SANHURI, supra note 60, at 3:177. 
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tions based on foodstuffs and currency.88 The differences among the 
schools are casuistic and complex and hardly worth recounting for 
purposes of this article. 
It should also be noted that forms of artifice (hiyal) were readily 
available according to most jurists of the classical era to the extent 
that any of these trades (in particular those concerning gold and sil­
ver and the items derived by analogy therefrom) proved troublesome. 
The simplest and most readily available artifice was the 'ina, which 
involved the sale and buyback of the same item at a higher price, a 
practice readily accepted by two of the four classical schools of 
thought, the Hanafi and the Shafi'i. 89 The Maliki school banned the 
practice outright,90 but certain Maliki jurists found their own form of 
artifice by deeming that tulus, or copper coins, were not covered by 
the riba prohibition,91 a position that the noted Maliki jurist Ibn 
Rushd, or Averroes, considered unduly narrow. 92 
IV. CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC FIN.<lliCE 
A. Dominant Methodology 
As set forth by two authorities on the subject of modern Islamic 
finance, Vogel and Hayes, the dominant methodology employed in the 
contemporary practice of Islamic finance, and the means by which 
faithfulness to classical rules is supposedly achieved, is dubbed "utili­
tarian choice," where rules are selected according to their utility.93 
Thus, for example, the Hanafi school permits istisna, or manufacture 
for hire, as described above, in contradistinction to the other schools. 
Because its rule is more harmonious with contemporary needs, its 
rules are adopted. Such a choice is not restricted to particular 
schools, even minority, or individual, opinions of jurists within the 
schools may be selected over the dominant view of the school. Thus, 
for example, the Hanafi permission of istisna generally permits the 
buyer of the manufactured product to rescind the contract at any 
point prior to his inspection of the product. Islamic financiers, how­
ever, use a view developed by an early Hanafi jurist Abu Yusuf that 
binds the buyer at the conclusion of the contract.94 Indeed, this 
88. NABIL A. SALEH, UNLAWFUL GAIN AND LEGITIMATE PROFIT IN ISLAMIC LAW 19­
20 (2d. ed. 1992). 
89. NICHOLAS DYLAN RAY, ARAB ISLAMIC BANKING AND THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC 
LAW 55 (1995). 
90. Id. at 56. 
91. Mahmoud El-Gamal, Islamic Bank Corporate Governance and Regulation: A 
Call for Mutualization 12-13 (2005) available at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-elgamalJ 
files/lBCGR.pdf. 
92. See IBN RUSHD, supra note 79, at 3:1568-71 ("and thus we see that the legal 
cause ('illa) is narrow ... because it does not extend beyond gold and silver"); see also 
EL-GAMAL, supra note 39, at 52. 
93. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 37. 
94. Id. at ]46-47; see also KASANl, supra note 86, at 7:3168-69. 
•
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methodology is not only the dominant form used in Islamic finance 
but has been widely applied in other areas as well. Kristen Stilt ably 
demonstrates how the Iraqi Personal Status Law has developed from 
the shari'a using a very similar methodology. 95 
Unfortunately, however, as a means of ensuring harmony with 
the classical era, "utilitarian choice" is logically fallacious and so pa­
tently riddled with ideological bias as to serve little function beyond 
the rhetorical. Respecting the logic of the method, it is difficult to see 
how selecting the opinion of a single jurist such as Abu Yusuf or Ibn 
Taymiyya to the derogation of every other jurist of record in the class­
ical era shows respect or faithfulness to classical rules. Moreover, in 
determining which rule serves greater "utility," no compass seems to 
be used other than that the modern scholar prefers one rule to an­
other. "Utilitarian choice," it appears, is little more than application 
of the opinion that any given authority happens to like for any rea­
son. Using this methodology, virtually anyone from Ronald Reagan 
to Vladimir Lenin could readily create a commercial system to their 
liking from the classical corpus. 
As noted earlier, commentators are well aware that true un­
bounded choice provides almost no limits on the type of rules a jurist 
can create. Vogel and Hayes assure us, therefore, that jurists make it 
a point to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate choice. 
The selection among competing opinions through understanding the 
context in which they were made and remaining "immensely respect­
ful of the past" in choosing a rule is entirely legitimate.96 What is 
unacceptable is irresponsible, decontextualized "patching" (talfiq) 
where rules are merely put together mechanically to meet current 
commercial demands.97 Vogel and Hayes note that scholars never 
admit to "patching" but often accuse others of engaging in it. Vogel 
and Hayes seem to take rather seriously the difference between the 
two forms of selection.98 They note that were "patching" deemed ac­
ceptable, then one might readily justify the Western contract system 
on classical grounds through opportunistic selection of rules, thereby 
eroding the "internal logic" of the Islamic system.99 
Thus does it become clear that in order for Islamic finance to re­
tain any semblance of credibility as an extension of classical doctrine, 
then the life of the law must be based on "internal logic" and the dis­
tinction between opportunistic patching and responsible "utilitarian 
choice" must be meaningful and ascertainable. Neither is true, as the 
following sections make amply clear. 
95. Kristen Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal 
System, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695, 721 (2004). 
96. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 37-38. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 37. 
99. Id. 
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B. The Case of the Disappearing Stipulation Prohibition 
Nothing better demonstrates the entire poverty of the "utilita­
rian choice" methodology, as juxtaposed against "patching," than the 
curious disappearance of the classical rules prohibiting stipulations 
in contract. With the notable exception of the work of Professors Vo­
gel and Hayes, contemporary books on Islamic finance are devoid of 
any mention of stipulations. loo Professor El-Gamal refers us to two 
major prohibitions in finance developed by classical jurists,IOI and 
Dr. Ray tells us that "there are two fundamental limiting principles 
on commercial activity in Islamic law, the prohibitions on riba and 
gharar."102 Professor Warde likewise discusses two central prohibi­
tions,103 and Professor Saleh describes riba and gharar as the "main 
prohibitory rules" acknowledged by Muslims. l04 
These statements are at worst demonstrably false and at best 
woefully incomplete. How can it be that the very elaborately devel­
oped set of prohibitions concerning stipulations from the classical era 
has come to be disregarded in its entirety, without so much as an 
explanation from the modern experts on the practice? This miscon­
ception dates back to the Majalla, the Ottoman era codification of 
shari'a. The drafters of the Majalla, along with eminent scholars 
such as Dr. Arabi, Professors Vogel and Hayes and Dean Sanhuri 
provide the explanation. It is that Islamic finance, and modern Is­
lamic contract theory generally, has adopted the views of Ibn 
Taymiyya, who, we are told, permits stipulations that do not either 
independently violate the shari'a (thereby making a prohibited item 
into something permissible) or strip the contract of its intended ob­
ject. 105 On this authority, all other classical references may be 
discarded. 
This is technically true, but not properly understood. As the emi­
nent authorities suggest, Ibn Taymiyya specifically indicates that a 
stipulation that violates a clearly established provision of founda­
tional text (namely, either a Quranic verse or Prophetic hadith) is 
prohibited. l06 Ibn Taymiyya is a Hanbali, and the long standing 
Hanbali position has been, based on a Prophetic statement reported 
by the eponym of the school, and cited elsewhere by Ibn Taymiyya 
himself, that two stipulations in a contract of sale violates the shari'a 
on the basis of a Prophetic hadith.107 This means that Ibn 
100. Id. at 97-107. 
101. EL-GAMAL, supra note 39, at 10. 
102. RAY, supra note 89, at 28 (emphasis added). 
103. IBRAHIM WARDE, ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY ch. 3 (2005). 
104. SALEH, supra note 88, at 3. 
105. ARABI, supra note 78, at 39 (quoting the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Majalla); SANHURI, supra note 60, at 170; VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 101. 
106. IBN TAYMIYYA, supra note 74, at 3:474. 
107. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. 
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Taymiyya's admittedly more liberal position would still ban two stip­
ulations in a sale of any item. Given the extent to which sales are a 
fundamentally important part of the Islamic finance paradigm, as 
demonstrated in Section IV.D infra, this is a very serious restriction 
requiring all contracts of sale to adhere to the nominate form, with 
one possible stipulated variation. The drafters of the Majalla, Dr. 
Arabi, Dean Sanhuri and Vogel and Hayes wish this away, indicating 
that Ibn Taymiyya speaks very favorably of permissibility and never 
mentions the "two stipulations" rule in the context of his discussion 
on stipulations. lOB In the words of Dean Sanhuri: 
And Ibn Taymiyya did not mention the prohibition on 
the two stipulations or the prohibition on two sales or the 
sale and a loan. And as a result, through the hand of Ibn 
Taymiyya, Islamic law developed permissions on stipula­
tions with the closest possible relationship to the law of the 
modern West. 109 
The statement is entirely incorrect. It is true that Ibn Taymiyya 
does notmention the "two stipulations" rule in the context of his dis­
cussion on the subject of stipulations, preferring instead merely to 
indicate that stipulations cannot violate any specific provision in 
foundational text (nass) or an analogy drawn therefrom. 110 However, 
while discussing illegitimate means used to circumvent the riba pro­
hibition, Ibn Taymiyya specifically quotes a provision from founda­
tional text that severely limits stipulations; namely, the prohibition 
of two of them in a contract of sale. ll1 
Nothing would therefore seem to be a more extreme form of 
decontextualized and highly mechanical and opportunistic "patching" 
than to adopt Ibn Taymiyya's position on the permissibility of stipu­
lations unless there is clearly established foundational text to the 
contrary without simultaneously accepting his conclusion that the 
"two stipulations" prohibition is clearly established by foundational 
text. Yet this seems to be what Islamic financiers have done in decid­
ing that the classical rules on stipulations no longer present any sig­
nificant obstacles to developing modern Islamic forms of commerce 
and finance. So far as it appears to date and certainly to the knowl­
edge of this author, the position taken with respect to stipulations in 
Islamic finance is more liberal than anything that any classical jurist 
of record seems to have ever said. Even with the pluralism and the 
multiplicity of opinions spanning centuries, the modern position on 
stipulations, dating back to the 19th century Majalla, is hardly de­
108. ARABI, supra note 78, at 59-60; SANHURI, supra note 60, at 172; VOGEL & 
HAYES, supra note 2, at 101 (citing Sanhuri). 
109. SANHURI, supra note 60, at 172. 
110. IBN TAYMIYYA, supra note 74, at 474. 
111. [d. at 418. 
2008] MUEZZIN'S CALL AND THE DOW JONES BELL 447 
fensible on the grounds of "utilitarian choice," or any other choice for 
that matter. 
Thus, concerning this fundamental prohibition of the classical 
shari'a, the description of modern Muslim scholars interpreting class­
ical doctrine in a manner "immensely respectful of the past,"1l2 to 
create the doctrine that underlines Islamic finance while still remain­
ing faithful to the internal logic of the shari'a, seems more hopeful 
legend than hard reality. 
C. On the Semantic Nature of the Gharar Prohibition 
Although gharar, in contradistinction to the rules on stipula­
tions, remains a central prohibition within Islamic [mance, more 
often than not it is conveniently ignored, less through formalist arti­
fice and more through semantic reclassification. The most obvious 
example of this concerns the prohibition on insurance on the basis of 
gharar, on the theory that the policyholder pays a premium without 
any knowledge as to the timing or the amount to be received in re­
turn, or indeed whether anything at all will be received in return.1l3 
Fortunately, however, through the "respectful" selection of class­
icallaw rules, we learn that at least among some in the Maliki school 
of thought, gharar does not apply as to gifts, thereby, for example, 
enabling a father to gift to his son an uncertain amount of money at 
an uncertain date.H4 Therefore, while insurance is forbidden, gift­
based insurance based on notions of solidarity, known as takaful, is 
not. A pious Muslim who wishes to remain faithful to the rules of the 
classical era must not, the Islamic financier insists, pay premiums to 
an insurance company, but rather make a donation to a takaful com­
pany that keeps an account in his name. When there is a need for the 
takaful company to make a payout, it will not be gharar, but instead 
a gift from the participants to their fellow Muslim in need. lI5 
So goes the rhetoric. Unfortunately, however, the takaful is a for 
profit company. The donations and payouts are contractually obliga­
tory. There is nothing of substance as opposed to semantics that dis­
tinguishes this from a conventional insurance contract. If there is 
"respect" for the classical era rules in the position of Islamic finance 
towards gharar, it is exceedingly difficult to locate. 
D. On the Centrality of Riba 
Given the foregoing, it would seem puzzling indeed that Islamic 
finance would take the interest prohibition as seriously as it does. In 
the first place, the central prohibition of riba did not concern interest 
112. See supra note 96. 
113. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 150. 
114. [d. at 152. 
115. [d.; M. MA'SUM BILLAH, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF TAKAFUL 24-25 (2001). 
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on loans, but forms of trades. It would be relatively easy for Islamic 
finance to respect those rules in large part, but simply exempt money 
from them. For this there is abundant precedent. The Hanafi school 
of thought limited riba to items that can be weighed or measured by 
volume,116 and clearly contemporary currency cannot be so weighed 
or measured, at least from the time that the gold standard was 
dropped. The Maliki school applied riba to currency, but then many 
of the Maliki jurists exempted copper coins. 117 The Hanafi and 
Shafi'i schools permitted transparent artifices easy to create, among 
them the sale and immediate buyback of the same item at a 
markup.l18 There seems ample basis among the schools ofthought to 
make any concerns of interest based on the riba trade ban largely 
irrelevant. 
However, the ban on interest is central to Islamic finance, the 
one prohibition that is taken the most seriously, and though it is 
often circumvented, this is done neither through the opportunistic se­
lection of juristic opinions, as per stipulations, nor through semantic 
reclassification, as per gharar, but rather through elaborate, formal 
artifices such as the murabaha, where an item is bought by the bank 
and sold to the borrower at a mark-up that corresponds to a prevail­
ing interest rate, and often then resold by the borrower to a third 
party for its cash value. 119 The more transparent artifices accepted 
by schools of thought in the classical era, such as the sale and imme­
diate buyback, are repudiated by Islamic financiers who, incredibly, 
make the claim that the shari'a bans artifice with respect to its 
prohibitions. 120 This is a demonstrably false statement as a historical 
matter, at least among some schools of thought, and, if taken seri­
ously, would lead to the immediate disintegration of Islamic finance, 
based as it is upon formalist artifice, albeit of a more elaborate sort, 
in the best of cases. 
Those who develop alternative interpretations of riba are dis­
missed as insufficiently respectful of the Islamic tradition, "defeat­
ists" who are "apologetic about Islam."121 This is in contradistinction 
116. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 
117. See supra note 91. 
118. See supra note 89. 
119. SALEH, supra note 88, at 117. 
120. See, e.g., SALEH, supra note 88, at 117; VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 22. 
121. MUHAMMAD NEJATULLAH SIDDIQI, BANKING WITHOUT INTEREST 7 (1983) 
(describing the position permitting some forms of interest as "defeatist"); Muhammad 
Uzair, The Impact of Interest Free Banking, 3 J. ISL BANK. & FIN. 39,40 (1984) ("By 
this time, there is a complete consensus of all . . . schools . . . and among Islamic 
economists that interest in all forms, of all kinds, and for all purposes is completely 
prohibited in Islam. Gone are the days when people were apologetic about Islam and 
contended that interest for commercial and business purposes, as presently charged 
by banks, was not prohibited ...."). See also COUNCIL OF ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY, CONSOLI­
DATED RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ISLAMIC ECONOMIC SYSTEM 7 (1983) (indicating the 
presence of "complete unanimity among all schools of thought in Islam that the term 
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to their reactions to liberal theories on the other bans, which are 
often muted or even acquiescent. Therefore, Dean Sanhuri's liberal 
approach towards stipulations on the basis of a questionable reading 
of Ibn Taymiyya has been adopted in Islamic finance, but his inge­
nious reading of Ibn Rushd and Ibn Taymiyya's disciple, Ibn Qayyim 
Al Jawziyya, to suggest that the riba ban need not encompass inter­
est in contemporary circumstances, is rejected soundly. 122 The differ­
ence, in tone, in approach, and in outcome, is absolutely striking. In 
one case, a tangential consequence to the classical ban on trades in 
precious metals and foodstuffs is made into the centerpiece ofmodern 
practice, the essence of Islamicity in commerce. In the other, central 
classical doctrines are ignored or downplayed in a manner that could 
readily be described, as they are in the context of the interest ban, as 
apologetic or defeatist. The "internal logic" of this law is profoundly 
illogical. 
E. On Alternative Approaches to Islamic Finance 
The practice of Islamic finance thus cannot be legitimized or sup­
ported as some sort of faithful extension of the rules of the classical 
era. What then, of Professor EI-Gamal's "spirit" of the classical rules 
or Dean Sanhuri's "underlying principles"? Can it be that contempo­
rary Islamic finance practice simply erred in its quest for the "inter­
nallogic" of the law, and that another approach more accurately taps 
the sentiment of the past millennium of legal thought? 
Dean Sanhuri's efforts seem particularly difficult to sustain in a 
post-Realist age. Perusing classical authorities who clearly have not 
shown the slightest concern for a general theory of contract or obliga­
tion, Dean Sanhuri creates one for them through some sort of "scien­
tific" comparative process, finds it to be remarkably similar to Roman 
law with slight variation, and then begins the process of copying se­
lect provisions European civil codes for insertion into the Egyptian 
civil code on this, purportedly Islamic basis. 123 The point, it should 
be emphasized again, is not to disparage Dean Sanhuri's remarkable 
civil code, but only to indicate that this sort of endeavor, discovering 
legal theories from the ideas of medieval authors who never consid­
ered them, reflects the ideological biases of the drafter and the mate­
rial needs of the times more than the true "spirit" of the classical law. 
riba stands for interest in all its types and forms"); ABDULLAH SAEED, ISLAMIC BANK­
ING AND INTEREST 50 (describing this position as "dominant" and "the basis of Islamic 
banking theory as well as practice"). 
122. SANHURI, supra note 60, at 234-36, 240-43 (suggesting that the prohibition on 
loans and exchanges of items of a similar value is only a "prohibition of means," to 
prevent a separate form of riba involving high levels of interest on potentially default­
ing loans). 
123. HILL, supra note 55, at 78-79. 
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For his part, Professor EI-Gamal cannot be faulted for a lack of 
effort, endeavor as he does mightily to explain the economic bases of 
the riba ban on the basis of Pareto-efficiency, largely through his in­
terpretation of the words of Ibn Rt..shd.124 I am deeply skeptical that 
Ibn Rushd's generalizations, which have to do with achieving 'jus­
tice" ('adl)125 in transactions through making sure that equal values 
of goods are exchanged for one another, really relates to a concept 
such as Pareto-efficiency, which could not have had any real meaning 
for Ibn Rushd, as opposed to fraud or unfairness in result, particu­
larly for the less knowledgeable party. Dean Sanhuri, for example, 
quotes precisely the same passage from Ibn Rushd as EI-Gamal does, 
as well as an additional passage from another jurist, to identify three 
different purposes for the prohibition of riba: to prevent hoarding (ih­
tikar), to guard against turning currency into a commodity over 
which to speculate, and to ban fraud and exploitation over the trade 
in items of the same genus.l26 It seems once again as ifthe search for 
purpose might have more to do with the predispositions of the person 
performing the searching, with Professor EI-Gamal the economist 
finding Pareto-efficiency and Dean Sanhuri the left-leaning jurist en­
amored of social justice127 finding something relating to prevention of 
monopoly and exploitation. 
However, the more central point is that to define Ibn Rushd's 
position, which appears to be an embrace of the Hanafi position with­
out the artifices,128 as demonstrating the central purpose of the class­
ical law, is to repeat the mistakes of the Islamic financiers, of 
selecting the jurist whose views correspond to those of the person per­
forming the selection, to the derogation of all other jurists.129 Quite 
clearly, most Hanafis, by accepting such artifice as the sale and im­
mediate buyback of the same item at a higher price, were not terribly 
concerned about Pareto-efficiency, as Professor EI-Gamal would have 
it, or exploitation, as Dean Sanhuri might have it. The same might 
be said of the Shafi'is who held a similar position, and even the 
Malikis beyond Ibn Rushd, who by Ibn Rushd's own explanation cre­
ate categories governed and not governed by riba that often exclude 
the most fungible good of all, minted copper coins, in a manner disap­
124. EL-GAMAL, supra note 39, at 52-53. See also EI-Gamal,An Economic Explana­
tion of the Prohibition ofRiba in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence (May 2, 20011, avail­
able at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-elgamal/files/riba.pdf. 
125. IBN RUSHD, supra note 79, at 3:1071-72. 
126. SANHURI, supra note 60, at 235-36. 
127. Shalakany, supra note 57, at 204-05. 
128. EL-GAMAL, supra note 39, at 52-53; IBN RUSHD, supra note 79, at 3:1071-72. 
129. EI-Gamal almost seems to recognize this, describing Ibn Rushd as having pro­
vided the "best" analysis for the reasons for the riba prohibition, but providing no 
explanation of precisely how the "best" analysis is to be determined, other than pure 
ideological preference. EL-GAMAL, supra note 91, at 12. 
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proved of by Ibn Rushd.130 The elsewhere beloved Ibn Taymiyya's 
explanation of the riba prohibition roots the doctrine in an interest in 
avoiding the exploitation and oppression of those in desperate cir­
cumstances.l31 Neither Dean Sanhuri nor Professor El-Gamal seems 
to have found a very satisfactory explanation for these permutations 
of the rules. All searches for a purpose, a spirit or an internal logic 
seem to have been a failure. 
Some commentators, eager in their quest to demonstrate a pur­
pose to the classical law, point out that the renowned medieval jurist 
Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali indicated that all rules of the shari'a were 
concerned with the preservation of one of five aspects of human exis­
tence and association; namely, religion, life, family, mind and prop­
erty.132 Such commentators emphasize that this proved immensely 
influential in the classical era and that these are therefore the under­
lying purposes of the shari'a by broad juristic agreement, equally ap­
plicable in modern times. 133 This approach has also proved 
appealing in the modern era; the Egyptian Supreme Court in its deri­
vation of the purposes of the shari'a uses a variant of Ghazali's list to 
find purposes to the shari'a, though that court seems to have reserved 
its right to enunciate other purposes as well, without providing much 
by way of guidelines as to how such additional purposes are to be 
discovered.134 
The scholarship that emphasizes these trends is certainly inter­
esting and noteworthy, but ultimately hopeless as an effort to gain 
clarity on any purposive approach to the shari'a. The purposes as 
defined by Ghazali are so general and vague as to be effectively 
meaningless, which probably explains their supposed popularity. It 
is hard to think of any rule that any rulemaker in any location at any 
time would ever think of issuing that could not be justified on the 
basis of preservation of one of the five factors listed above. Some­
thing other than purpose, spirit, internal logic or underlying princi­
ples must therefore be operating to explain the development of the 
rules of Islamic finance, a matter to which I turn in the next section. 
130. See supra note 91. 
131. IBN TAYMIYVA, supra note 74, at 3:415-16. 
132. See, e.g., Asifa Qureishi, Interpreting the Qur'an and the Constitution: Simi­
larities in Text, Tradition and Reason in Islamic and American Jurisprudence, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 67, 101-02 (2007); see also LOMBARDI, supra note 4, at 32-34; Khaled 
Abou El Fadl, Constitutionalism and the Islamic Sunni Legacy, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & 
NEAR E. L. 67, 101 (2001). 
. 133. See supra note 132. 
134. LOMBARDI, supra note 4, at 180-81, 188-98 (supplying ideas for general guide­
lines that the Court appears to be adopting to identify the goals of the shari'a). 
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V. ON ISLAMIC ECONOMICS AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 
In order to understand precisely how Islamic finance developed 
in the way that it did, it is important to look at the social and histori­
cal context in which the Islamic economics movement arose; namely, 
the Islamic revivalism of the middle of the last century.135 I focus 
herein on the three figures described as founders of Islamic econom­
ics, the Pakistani Abu A'la Maududi, the Egyptian militant Sayyid 
Qutb and the Iraqi Shi'i jurist Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr,136 to show 
how their ideas gave new meaning to classical prohibitions in com­
merce and finance, and why these meanings have so much resonance 
in the modern era. This is the first of the two influences on the prac­
tice of Islamic finance, with Part VI providing more detail on the sec­
ond, the role of the global commercial order. 
A.	 On the Centrality of Social Justice to the Islamic Economics 
Paradigm 
As Timur Kuran has properly noted, Islamic economics did not 
derive out of any desire to improve economic performance in the Mus­
lim world per se, but in a search for a distinctly Islamic identity.137 
To add further specificity to Kuran's claim, Islamic economics, as de­
veloped by its founders, sought to project itself as an alternative eco­
nomic paradigm, a "third way" between the ubiquitous state control 
implicit in Marxism and what was viewed as the rapacious, exploita­
tive and inhumane forms of capitalism prevalent in the West,138 It 
was the economic equivalent to the political resistance so often ex­
tolled by militant organizations in the Middle East.139 Social justice, 
therefore, was central to the understanding of this framework, a con­
cept that distinguished the Islamic economic system from capitalism, 
and indeed Qutb's ideas on economics largely appear in a highly in­
fluential polemic entitled Social Justice in Islam.l40 Sadr also re­
garded social justice as fundamental, one of the three cornerstones of 
Islamic economics, along with mixed property ownership (mulkiyya 
135. Mahmoud El-Gamal, "Interest" and the Paradox ofContemporary Islamic Law 
and Finance, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 108, 122 (2003). 
136.	 Id. at 115. 
137. Timur Kuran, The Discontents of Islamic Economic Morality, 86 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 438, 438-39 (1996) [hereinafter Discontents]; Timur Kuran, The Genesis of Is­
lamic Economics, 64 Social Research 301, 301-305 (1997) [hereinafter Genesis]; 
Gamal, supra note 135, at 122. 
138. See, e.g., MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL-SADR, IQITISADUNA 270 (3d. ed. 1969) [hereinaf­
ter "Iqtisaduna"]; SYED ABUL ALA MAUDOODI, ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF MAN AND THE 
ISLAMIC SOLUTION 27-28 (10th ed. 1992). 
139. See El-Gamal, supra note 135, at 122 (noting influence of Islamic revivalism 
on Islamic economics); Discontents, supra note 137, at 438-39 (providing specific ex­
ample of Maududi); Genesis, supra 137 at 302-05 (also providing specific example of 
Maududi). 
140. SAYYID QUTB, AL-AnALA AL-IJTIMA'IYYAH FIL ISLAM [Social Justice in Islam] 
(2d ed. 1953). 
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muzdawija) and limited economic freedom. 141 Maududi's work is re­
plete with references to rapacious and inequitable forms of capitalism 
as compared with Islam's concern for social justice. 142 
In this paradigm, it should be apparent that rules concerning the 
trades of items that can be weighed as against those that can be mea­
sured, or restricting the use of stipulations in a sale, serve no pur­
pose. It is not sensible to say that the West is rapacious because it 
allows sales of items with more than one stipulation attached to 
them. 
However, if the extension of the prohibited riba trades into 
money loans becomes the focus, so that the ban is on interest and not 
on trades of some commodities for others, a better case of exploitation 
can be made, at least on a superficial level. Thus did riba to the fun­
damentalists come not to mean the banned trades as set forth in the 
Prophetic hadith, but rather solely interest, and usury.l43 The six 
items hadith dropped from their discourse entirely and was replaced 
with references to the verses of the Qur'an itself, which never defines 
riba but rather prohibits it and opposes it stridently as the practice of 
the shameless, who "double and redouble" their profits,144 who en­
gage in a form of theft145 that is almost the o~posite of charity, 146 and 
who will find themselves consigned to Hell,147 
The definition of riba as no more nor less than the taking of in­
terest on a loan served the purposes of the fundamentalists nearly 
perfectly. The West permits institutions to lend money to borrowers 
in distress, and then to guarantee for themselves a return, with no 
risk at all, a sure form of oppression.148 Thus those with money will 
find their money doubled and redoubled, as per the Quran, and 
wealth will be perpetuated within the moneyed classes. 149 The idly 
rich will prosper, drinking the blood and sweat of the poor in their 
greed, voracious in their appetites, forcing the working class to slave 
unremittingly to allow the rich to receive their riskless return.150 
Nor, according to Sadr, will such a system be efficient, because the 
capital class will not necessarily lend their money to the most worthy 
141. Iqtisaduna, supra note 138, at 357. 
142. MAUDOODI, supra note 138, at 27-28. 
143. QUTB, supra note 140, at 150. 
144. Quran 3:130 ("0 you who believe, devour not riba, making it double and 
redouble...."). 
145. Quran 2:275, 4:161 (promising a "painful punishment" for those who take 
riba and those who devour the property of others falsely). 
146. Quran 30:39 ("And whatever you layout as riba, so that it may increase in the 
property of men, it shall not increase with Allah; and whatever you give in charity, 
desiring Allah's pleasure, you Slhall get manifold."). 
147. Quran 2:275 (indicating that those who continue to engage in riba following 
the prohibition will be "companions of the Fire."). 
148. QUTB, supra note 140, at 151. 
149. Id. at 150; MAUDOODI, supra note 138, at 27-28. 
150. QUTB, supra note 140, at 149. 
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projects given that the loans earn a fixed return irrespective of the 
success of the venture. 151 
In the place of such exploitative debt, the fundamentalists ar­
gued, Islam calls for the creation of institutions and instruments that 
are based on social justice, mutuality and sharing. The shameless 
lender who offers one dirham and demands two later is destructive of 
social harmony and the Islamic brotherhood, as he makes an enemy 
of his borrower.152 Mutual help, cooperation and support are the ba­
sis of the Islamic economic system,153 so capital and labor should 
partner together to earn profits, an idea that Sadr takes so seriously 
as to call for a ban on all hired labor, at least with respect to the 
exploitation of raw natural wealth, notwithstanding Muhammad's 
hadith clearly in favor of hired labor generally,154 Sadr, however, is 
unconcerned with the hadith, alternatively describing it as illegiti­
mately derived, or if legitimate taken out of its proper context.155 It 
is apparent that Sadr's interest lies not in adherence to foundational 
text in any formal sense but rather in the creation of a new Muslim 
order, uniquely Islamic, thoroughly just and contradistinct and sepa­
rate from that of the broader global community. The creation of an 
Islamic identity, informed by Islamic ethics and ideological disposi­
tion, is what animates Sadr much more than the terms of founda­
tional text. 
The prohibition on gambling, supposedly the Quranic basis for 
the gharar doctrine, was justified on the same basis as riba by Qutb, 
as destructive of social harmony and brotherly feeling (ikha) because 
profits are not based on mutuality or sharing, but the gain of one 
party at the expense of the other,156 Later Islamic economists, draw­
ing on this, extended the justification to commercial gharar in a more 
explicit fashion. 157 
This is of course a highly simplistic notion of debt and specula­
tion. Limited liability corporations and bankruptcy laws make the 
idea of riskless debt preposterous, and debt clearly increases the ac­
cess of entrepreneurs to capital rather than preserves classes of 
wealth in their current states. Nevertheless, the discourse, of pro­
test, of revolution, of resistance to an established order, which is colo­
nizing and cruel and rapacious, and its replacement with Islamic 
social justice, mutuality and brotherhood, proved immensely power­
ful, in both the economic context and the political. Sadr's ideas were 
151. Iqtisaduna, supra note 138, at 552. 
152. QUTB, supra note 140, at 150. 
153. Id. 
154. Iqtisaduna, supra note 138, at 360-62. 
155. Id. 
156. QUTB, supra note 140, at 143. 
157. See Timur Kuran, On the Notion ofEconomic Justice in Contemporary Islamic 
Thought, 21 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 171, 175 (1989) (describing the importance of 
the mutuality principle among Islamic economists in the context of gharar). 
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the most immediately successful, culminating in the establishment of 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran,158 though Sadr himself was killed in 
his native Iraq by Saddam Hussein in 1980.159 Qutb's notions of mil­
itancy and transformation of societies that have so strayed so far 
from Islam as to be equivalent to those of the pre-Islamic era, the so­
called Days of Ignorance,160 has led to his being dubbed the "father of 
militant jihad."161 Maududi was the founder of Pakistan's current 
Islamist political parties, whose influence has affected the structure 
of Pakistan's political system.162 The importance ofthese individuals 
in political and cultural circles cannot be doubted. Their effect on 
traditionalist doctrine is demonstrated in the next section. 
B. On the Influence of the Fundamentalist Vision 
According to the conventional paradigm, all of these ruminations 
do not add up to a great deal, because they are merely an expression 
of a political force which has nothing to do with the substance of the 
classical doctrine on which Islamic finance is supposedly built. AB a 
result, Vogel and Hayes do not cite once Sadr, Qutb or Maududi and 
instead insist on a traditionalist approach that is supposedly apa­
thetic to politics and seeks instead to remain in quiet harmony with 
classical doctrine. Vogel and Hayes insist that the radical vision, at 
least outside of Iran, has had little influence on the form and struc­
ture of Islamic finance.163 
Yet we have seen that the methodologies of Islamic finance are 
simply indefensible on the basis of a logical, careful and respectful 
extension of classical rules. By contrast, the fundamentalist claims of 
economic and social justice and their association with Islamic fi­
nance, which Vogel and Hayes attempt to downplay or deny, are ab­
solutely central to the rhetoric of Islamic finance. One of the most 
prominent and well known proponents of the contemporary practice 
is Muhammad Taqi Usmani, a former judge on the Shari'a Appellate 
Bench of the Pakistani Supreme Court,164 and one of twelve mem­
bers of the OIC Islamic Fiqh AcademY,165 an organization that Vogel 
158. CHIBLI MALLAT, THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW 59-78, 142-43; 188-89 (1993) 
(detailing Sadr's intellectual contributions to the Iranian Constitution and the respect 
afforded him among Sunni and Shi'i Muslims in the realm of economics). See also 
T.M. Aziz, The Role of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr in Shi'i Political Activism from 
1958-1980,25 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 207, 218 (1993). 
159. MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL-SADR, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 31 (Arif 
Abdul Hussain trans., 2d ed. 2005). 
160. See FELDMAN, supra note 48, at 43-44. 
161. JOHN L. ESPOSITO, UNHOLY WAR: TERROR IN THE NAME OF ISLAM 8 (2002). 
162. See FELDMAN, supra note 48, at 121-24. 
163. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 27 n.2. 
164. MUHAMMAD TAQI USMANI, AN INTRODUCTION To ISLAMIC FINANCE xi (3d ed. 
2002). 
165. See International Islamic Fiqh Academy, available in Arabic at http://www. 
fiqhacademy.org.sa/. 
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and Hayes cite dozens of times as a source of authority concerning 
rules of Islamic finance,166 Judge Usmani also serves on the Global 
Shari'a Advisory Board of HSBC's Islamic Finance practice and ad­
vises a variety of financial institutions on Islamic law.167 Judge Us­
mani therefore represents the very essence of the traditionalism and 
conservatism espoused by Vogel and Hayes as the basis of Islamic 
finance practice. It is therefore instructive to investigate Judge Us­
mani's views to see the extent to which the notions of the fundamen­
talists have played a role in developing the practice. I focus primarily 
on Judge Usmani's seminal opinion, written in 1999 while he was 
serving on the Shari'a Bench of the Pakistani Supreme Court, in 
which the Court instituted a ban on interest in Pakistan on the 
grounds that it is prohibited riba. 168 
First of all, it is instructive to note at the outset that Judge Us­
mani has clear political links to Maududi,169 one of the founders of 
Islamic economics, already suggesting a flow of ideas and concepts 
from the traditionalist and the fundamentalist and the reverse. This 
is immediately evident when one reads Judge Usmani's opinion con­
cerning riba and interest in Pakistan. Judge Usmani raises the ques­
tion of whether or not "injustice" might be found in commercial forms 
of interestpo Judge Usmani immediately indicates that although 
the Qur'an has declared that riba is interest and that God is after all 
the final word on what is and is not just, nevertheless "the evil conse­
quences of interest were never so evident in the past as they are to­
day."l71 Over one hundred pages of text follow to defend this claim. 
Judge Usmani indicates that treating money, which is supposed 
to be a medium of exchange, as a subject of trade leads to calamitous 
economic results, among them the fact that this drives production to 
higher than necessary levels and causes inflationP2 Judge Usmani 
166. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 322. 
167. See HSBC Aroanah, available at http://www.hsbcamanah.com/hsbclamanah. 
168. The actual effect of the court's judgment on finance in Pakistan is very much 
in question. Though Pakistani authorities have pledged to Islamicize the financial 
system in accordance with various judicial demands, in fact Islamic financial institu­
tions are only a tiny fraction of the financial industry in Pakistan according to IMF 
Reports. See International Monetary Fund, Pakistan: Selected Issues and Statistical 
Appendix at Table IV.l (Oct. 11, 2005), available at http://www.internationalmone­
taryfund.org/external/pubs/ftlscr/2005/cr05408.pdf; International Monetary Fund, 
Pakistan: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix 10 (June 8, 2004) ("[t]hus far, Is­
lamic banks do not constitute a significant part of the banking sector, accounting for 
1-2 percent of the total assets of the banking sector"). The impact of the decision, 
however, is less significant than the reasoning behind it, which demonstrates the ex­
tent to which Islamic finance has been deeply affected by the call of the 
fundamentalists. 
169. El-Gamal, supra note 135, at 115 n.19 (2003). 
170. Shari'ah Appellate Bench, Pakistan Supreme Court, Opinion Concerning 
Riba (J. Usmani section) (Dec. 22, 1999) 'l! 132 [hereinafter "Usmani Opinion"J. 
171. Id. at 'l! 133. 
172. Id. at 'l!'l! 148-52. 
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then fully adopts the rationale ofthe fundamentalists respecting eco­
nomic justice and mutuality. Judge Usmani indicates that it would 
be a "glaring injustice" if a financier were to be able to earn a profit 
by extending a loan to an enterprise under circumstances where the 
enterprise fails, and conversely it would be unjust to limit a financier 
to his fixed return where the enterprise earns large profits.l73 This is 
precisely Qutb's point (albeit without Qutb's incendiary rhetoric), 
that the lending of money creates animosity because it creates situa­
tions in which the interests of the parties are not aligned in the man­
ner that they should be. 
As for economic justice, Judge Usmani could not be more clear 
that "[i]nterest based loans have a persistent tendency to favor the 
rich and against the interest of the common people,"174 which is 
Maududi's precise position.175 Moreover, as Sadr argues, Judge Us­
mani indicates that because the financier is guaranteed a fixed re­
turn, loans will have no "relation with actual production," creating a 
"mismatch" between the supply of money and the provision of goods 
and services. 
This is not to suggest that Judge Usmani cons;ders classical doc­
trine irrelevant; quite the contrary, the entire first half of his opinion 
is based upon the interpretation of foundational text and classical ex­
egesis to develop and explain the ban on riba. His later work, while 
repeating the claims of the fundamentalists concerning economic jus­
tice and continuing to insist that interest creates massive disparities 
in wealth, clearly accepts the dominant practices of Islamic fi­
nance.l76 Still Judge Usmani has not, in his derivations of the law, 
ignored the fundamentalists' call but rather adopted them. The law of 
the classical doctors, it seems quite clearly, has been affected by the 
political upheavals of the era. 
Were Judge Usmani the only figure who took such a position, 
perhaps he could be dismissed as an anomaly, but it is abundantly 
clear that virtually every responsible jurist or Muslim scholar of re­
nown makes similar claims of economic justice and mutuality, based 
on the fundamentalists' call for revolutionary transformation to 
achieve something different from both the Marxist East and the capi­
talist West. Umar Chapra, an economist at the Islamic Development 
Bank in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and one of the most well-known and 
most prolific advocates of Islamic finance in the Muslim world, makes 
notions of social justice central to his robust defense of Islamic fi­
nance. l77 Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, a professor of economics in 
Saudi Arabia, opens one of his most well known books on Islamic eco­
173. Id. at 'll'l! 157-58. 
174. Id. at'j[ 161. 
175. Id. at 'll'll 163-68. 
176. See generally USMANI, supra note 164. 
177. See generally UMAR CHAPRA, TOWARDS A JUST MONETARY SYSTEM (1985). 
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nomics with the sentence "... the main insight offered by Islamic 
economics is that ethics matters"178 and another opens with the sen­
tence "[i]n prohibiting interest Islam has endeavored to do away with 
a hideous form of tyranny and injustice prevalent in human soci­
ety."179 Timur Kuran, an expert on and critic of Islamic economics, 
describes the prohibition of interest as being "the most celebrated" 
injunction in Islamic economics among the proponents of the disci­
pline. 18o These proponents ground the injunction, Kuran indicates, 
on the principle of fairness. lSI Ordinary Muslims are captivated by 
this perception and are shocked when, in seeking to obtain Islamic 
182financing, they discover the ruse, as it were. The sentiment is 
nearly universal. 
Even the rhetoric of Islamic finance respecting those who proffer 
alternative understandings of riba suggests the type of revolutionary 
confrontation and resistance to the global commercial order that the 
fundamentalists first articulated. Siddiqi refers to such approaches 
as "defeatist" and Uzair as "apologetics."183 This begs the question, 
to whom have they conceded this defeat, and to whom are they apolo­
gizing? The answer seems clear, it is the rapacious, exploitative 
West, with its vast disparities of wealth and its economic and social 
injustices. In place of it, the fundamentalists offer an alternative 
paradigm, that of resistance to the global order and its replacement 
with supposedly Muslim ideals and aspirations, that has proved so 
compelling in the Muslim community that even the staunchest tradi­
tionalists have adopted it. 
The influence is beyond rhetorical, it extends deep into the doc­
trine of Islamic finance as well. Islamic finance has adopted the fun­
damentalist focus on the riba prohibition as exploitative and unfair. 
This makes certain forms of artifice that were acceptable to some 
classical era jurists unavailable to modern financiers. If, for example, 
peppercorns were bought and resold in Islamic banking offices under 
the theory of the 'ina, or interest was taken on the theory that mod­
ern forms of money are not within the purview of the riba hadith, the 
claim that the riba prohibition advances social justice would be so 
178. MUHAMMAD NEJATULLAH SIDDIQI, ECONOMICS: AN ISLAMIC APPROACH iii 
(2001). Siddiqi's critique concerns economic affairs generally and not merely finance, 
but finance does play an important role in his analysis. See, e.g., id. at 85-86. 
179. SIDDIQI, supra note 121, at 11. 
180. Kuran, supra note 157, at 174. 
181. Id. 
182. See VOGEL & HAVES, supra note 2, at 26 n.2. For a typical Muslim expression 
of this perception and frustrations associated with it, see Tarik El-Diwany, Islamic 
Banking isn't Islamic, June 2003, available at http://www.islamic-finance.com/ 
item100j,htm ("[1'lhe words 'profit-sharing' are to be heard constantly at all of the 
conferences [on Islamic financel. Some ofthe scholars, if pressed, will talk about mov­
ing towards more satisfactory products .... But then everyone goes home and works 
on another murabaha contract."). 
183. See supra note 121 and accompanying references. 
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transparently ridiculous that it could not be credibly made. Islamic 
financiers as a result eschew such simple devices. 
The fundamentalists' lack of concern with stipulations is like­
wise mirrored in Islamic finance, where the stipulation prohibition 
has entirely disappeared from the discourse. Finally, Islamic fi­
nance, like the fundamtJntalist call, pays some limited attention to 
gharar, though not nearly as much as riba. In sum, the structure of 
the prohibitions, how seriously they are taken and the means used to 
avoid them adopt the fundamentalist paradigm almost entirely. 
An excellent example of the manner in which the fundamentalist 
influence can be found in core Islamic finance doctrine is the takaful, 
the supposedly "Islamic" form of insurance. That insurance should 
be considered gharar at all seems at first blush rather startling, 
given that a policyholder does not pay premiums as a "bet," in the 
hope of a payout later, but rather is purchasing a specific and easily 
valued service, avoidance of risk, that he is receiving in exchange for 
paYment of his premiums. It is no more a "bet," after all, then the 
hiring of a security officer to guard one's goods is a "bet" that someone 
might try to steal the goods. As Vogel and Hayes note, this argument 
was raised in 1962 and has never been accepted by the Islamic fi­
nance community. 184 
In its place, practitioners have proceeded with the ridiculous se­
mantics of the takaful, which creates a fiction whereby a for profit 
insurance company is in fact organizing some form of charity, and the 
policy holders are not "buying" anything but rather collecting dues to 
be paid to their fellow brother should a need arise. 185 The obliga­
tions, risk profiles and payments operate exactly in the manner that 
standard insurance would. At first blush, understanding Islamic fi­
nance to be an extension of classical doctrine, it is hard to see why the 
takaful is more sensible than the interpretation of insurance as the 
purchase of a readily valued service, as described above. 
It is the term "takafuV' or solidarity, and an understanding of 
the fundamentalist role in creating the practice that provides the an­
swer. Sales of services to protect goods do nothing to advance the 
claim that economic justice, fairness or mutuality are integral parts 
of the practice. By contrast, solidarity, gifting, and charity are cen­
tral to the vision and far more appealing as a result. Rather than use 
a more sensible means to permit insurance that could be defended as 
in harmony with classical theory, the practice prefers the fundamen­
talist rhetoric, even at the obvious expense of doctrinal 
incoherence. 186 
184. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 151 (citing work of Mustafa Al-Zarqa). 
185. See supra Part N.C. 
186. This is not to suggest that traditionalists are unconcerned with social justice 
and brotherhood, which are after all central to the idea oflslam, as they are to numer­
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The depth of the fundamentalist influence runs to the under­
standing of the Quran itself. The three most common translations of 
the Qur'an today define riba as "usury" without exception.187 Sup­
posedly, to a traditionalist, this is at least deeply reductive, at the 
most usury is one manifestation of a broader ban, the proper transla­
tion should be, if the classical doctrine is to be taken seriously, some­
thing along the lines proffered by Professor Saleh, "unlawful 
advantage by way of excess or deferment."188 This is reflected no­
where in the translations, however. 
VI. THE MONEY IN THE GAME 
That Islamic finance has almost nothing to do with economic jus­
tice, mutuality or social justice, at least as it is currently practiced, is 
not a matter deeply in dispute,189 To understand why this is so, not­
withstanding the fundamentalist influence, it is important to under­
stand the role of the financial community and global financial 
institutions in helping mold the practice from its earliest days. 
Islamic banking began in earnest in the 1970'S190 and was very 
much at that time dedicated to the notion of a finance institution that 
was based on profit sharing and mutuality as per the fundamentalist 
paradigm.191 The notion was of a two tiered partnership, where de­
positors would essentially be investors in the financial institution, 
and the financial institution would then be an investor in various 
portfolio investments. 192 This model has broad flexibility and some­
thing like it is used in a wide variety of commercial activities, includ­
ing private equity funds and money market accounts. 193 
Unfortunately, however, it is hardly an appropriate structure for a 
bank. The monitoring costs would be immense, given that invest­
ments based on profit-based returns require more careful monitoring 
ous other religions. However, it would seem clear that those interested in maintain­
ing harmony with classical doctrine would not jettison an approach that would permit 
the practice of insurance on grounds that seem entirely sensible in favor of some form 
oflegal nonsense concerning "solidarity" ifnot for the fundamentalists' insistence that 
notions of brotherhood are a central plank of Islamic economics and Islamic 
commerce. 
187. See, e.g., USC-MSA Compendium of Muslim Texts, http://www.usc.eduJdeptJ 
MSA/quranlqmtintro.html (containing the three translations of the Quran most cited, 
those ofYusuf Ali, Marmaduke Mohammad Pickthall and M.H. Shakir). 
188. SALEH, supra note 88, at 11. 
189. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 26-27; Haider Ala Hamoudi, Jurisprudential 
Schizophrenia: On Form and Function in Islamic Finance, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 605, 606­
07 (2007). 
190. WARDE, supra note 103, at 73. 
191. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 130-31; El-Gamal, supra note 135, at 124. 
192. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 130-31; El-Gamal, supra note 135, at 124. 
193. Haider Ala Hamoudi, Muhammad's Social Justice or Muslim Cant?: Langdel­
lianism and the Failures of Islamic Finance, 40 CORNELL INT'L L. REV. 89, 116-18 
(2007). 
461 2008] MUEZZIN'S CALL AND THE DOW JONES BELL 
than investments based on debt, where the return is fIxed. 194 The 
returns could hardly be guaranteed as they are in a bank if the re­
turns were based on profIt; in fact, there could be losses, which could 
lead to a bank run. 195 Early Islamic banks found their start trouble­
some for precisely this reason.196 
Some of the problems above could be avoided with prudent, safe 
investments in highly liquid equities, but while the depositors might 
then be satisfied, the bank's potential customers, the borrowers in 
the conventional paradigm, would find their needs unmet by the 
money market fund. Some sort of institution, which could bridge the 
short term liquidity needs of depositors with the long term require­
ments of borrowers, and which could pool resources and add expertise 
to develop a balanced and healthy portfolio, would continue to be 
necessary. 
Thus, the profIt sharing fInancial institution, based on the funda­
mentalist vision of sharing and mutuality had largely failed, at least 
within the dominant global paradigm of what a bank was and how it 
was expected to operate. No institution organized on this basis could 
seem to turn a profit. Moreover, it would seem perfectly obvious that 
no global financial institution would be very interested in such an 
approach, either. Financial institutions such as Citibank and HSBC 
are not, it can be fairly assumed, interested in economic justice, profit 
sharing, or restructuring themselves to function as equity-based 
funds. It would also seem perfectly obvious that a fInancial institu­
tion would be happy to employ its own financial model in new coun­
tries, even if small form adjustments needed to be made, particularly 
where, as in states with petroleum reserves, there was potentially a 
great deal of money to be made. 197 
In addition, it could be fairly presumed that at least some Mus­
lim societies seeking economic and political advancement would look 
to the global institutions of power, money and influence as potential 
resources. Clearly Muslim societies found the fundamentalist call for 
a separate Islamic polity with its unique sense of identity derived 
from its own notions of ethics and morality appealing, but these same 
societies also wanted in the process to be important and influential 
players in the global arena, and fundamentalism alone was not pro­
viding the means to achieve this level of relevance, as the failure of 
the fundamentalist economic paradigm was making clear. 
Thus, global financial institutions were seeking new clients, 
economies in the Muslim world were eager to obtain new sources of 
194. Id.; see also VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 131. 
195. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 131. 
196. Id. 
197. WARDE, supra note 103, at 73 (indicating that Islamic banks began in earnest 
in oil economies). 
462 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 56 
financing, and the profit sharing bank and economic system had 
failed. This combination of factors led to the rise of the second influ­
ence on Islamic finance, that of meeting global commercial expecta­
tions. The practice began to reinvent itself,198 continuing with the 
rhetoric of exploitation and economic justice, rhetorically tying riba 
to a large extent and gharar to a smaller extent to the achievement of 
these goals, and paying no heed throughout to the rules of stipula­
tion. But where in the initial model, riba encompassed all economic 
equivalents to interest, the newer model developed highly elaborate 
artifices to circumvent riba while still making claims as to economic 
justice. The artifices and tricks did not involve exempting currency 
from the rules of riba, or engagement in sale and buyback, the funda­
mentalists' sway made this type of transparent trick impossible. In­
stead, the financial institutions relied largely on murabaha, which on 
its face is nothing more than a bank purchasing an item, say jewelry, 
on behalfof a client, for example, a jeweler, and then selling it to that 
jeweler at a mark-up to compensate it for its work in the process. 199 
However, when the mark-up is tied to a prevailing international in­
terest rate such as the London Interbank Offering Rate (LIBOR), 
warranties in the jewelry are never held by the bank but transferred 
to the jeweler, and the jewelry itself is never in the bank's hands for 
more than a fraction of a second, an interest transaction can be 
achieved in substance.2oo 
The acrobatics can be taken even one step further, if the client is 
not a jeweler and seeks cash from his bank instead. Using a practice 
known as tawarruq, the bank might purchase the jewelry, transfer it 
to the client with the LIBOR based markup, and the client might 
then immediately sell the jewelry back to the original owner of the 
jewelry for its immediate cash value.2°1 The jewelry might not even 
leave the original owner's physical possession. Some jurists might 
balk at the latter part of the transaction, fearing it intrudes too far 
onto the fundamentalist vision of economic justice in finance, but in 
such a case, that part of the transaction might be hidden from them. 
The basic murabaha, the jewelry at a markup, can receive shari'a 
approval, and the second part of the transaction, the resale of the 
jewelry back to the original owner, can be left out of the discussion 
either because the last part of the transaction is merely the sale of an 
item for cash, or because it will be performed without the bank's as­
198. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2, at 135. 
199. Id. 
200. Mahmoud EI-Gamal, Limits and Dangers of Shari'a Arbitrage, ISLAMIC FI­
NANCE PROJECT 4 (2005) available at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-elgamal/files/Arbi­
trage.pdf. 
201. Id. at 9. 
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sistance or support and therefore does not require the bank's 
approval.202 
The practice, and the supposedly classical rules that gird the 
practice, are thus nothing more than careful mediation, between the 
necessity of adopting conventional finance models and a desire to re­
tain the appearance of a populist fundamentalist vision of economic 
justice in finance. This is the case regardless of national boundaries, 
from Iran, where fundamentalist control was established in 1979, to 
Saudi Arabia, which professes a more historic connection to the class­
ical doctrine.203 The fundamentalist vision is central, but so is the 
need to make and attract money under the rules of a dominant global 
paradigm. Everybody, it might be said, wants to put pictures of ehe 
Guevara on their T-shirts, but nobody, among the institutions of in­
fluence, seems eager to join him in the jungle. 
VII. BEYOND ISLAMIC FINANCE 
The importance of Realism in understanding Islamic doctrine ex­
tends well beyond the commercial realm. In fact, the social and polit­
ical influences that led to the creation of Islamic finance apply with 
equal force with respect to nearly all other aspects of modern shari'a. 
Returning to the subject of jihad, it is clear that Maududi, Qutb and 
Sadr envisioned their form of protest, resistance and revolution 
against the dominant ideologies of the latter half of the twentieth 
century to be not only economic, but also political in nature.204 Sadr 
clearly articulated a notion of an Islamic state that Khomeini largely 
appropriated in the Islamic Republic of Iran,205 and Qutb wrote ex­
tensively on the forceful overthrow of Islamic governments that had 
strayed too far from his vision of true Islam.206 Maududi was slightly 
more conservative, but did articulate and seek to bring about some 
form of shari'a rule in Pakistan.207 
These fundamentalist visions of jihad as protest and revolution 
against the dominant, established global order are of immense influ­
ence among contemporary Islamist movements. Islamic revivalism 
has in many places added a new word to its lexicon, one undiscussed 
in the classical texts but near the lips of many living Muslims­
202. Id. at 7-8. 
203. RoY, supra note 2, at 140. 
204. Timur Kuran has made this amply clear in his groundbreaking work on the 
subject of Islamic economics. See Discontents, supra note 137, at 438-39; Genesis, 
supra note 137, at 302-05; TIMUR KURAN, ISLAM & MAMMON 1-38 (2005). In many 
ways, this Article extends Kuran's ideas on the relationship of Islamic revivalism to 
Islamic economics, and derivatively, Islamic finance, into the area oflegal doctrine, to 
demonstrate how far contemporary Islamic rules have strayed from their classical 
forebears, within and beyond Islamic finance. 
205. See supra note 158. 
206. FELDMAN, supra note 48, at 43-44; RoY, supra note 2, at 36. 
207. RoY, supra note 2, at 36. 
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muqawama, or resistance. The Palestinian Islamic revivalist move­
ment Hamas is in fact an acronym for the Islamic Resistance Move­
ment (harakat al-maqawama al-islamiyya).208 Hizbollah's website is 
available under the term muqawama (www.moqawama.org), and 
there are repeated references therein to the "resistance" in the "bat­
tle" against Israel. 209 The Iraqi insurgency against the United States 
always refers to itself as the "resistance."210 The Organization of the 
Islamic Conference sought to define terrorism in a manner that ex­
empts acts of "resistance to foreign aggression" (emphasis added).211 
The modern forms ofjihad are defended not only by "fundamen­
talists" like Sayyid Qutb, but even by authorities like Yusuf 
Qaradawi, a "traditionalist" attaching himself to classical author­
ity.212 Qaradawi advises Hamas, the Palestinian "fundamentalist" 
organization, and legitimates on Islamic grounds its violent activities 
against civilians in the West Bank. This is in clear contradistinction 
to a traditionalist paradigm in which social and political improve­
ments are supposedly sought through careful and quiet adherence to 
the law.213 
This should be unremarkable. Qaradawi is well aware of the 
popularity of Hamas in the broader Middle East, and whether he 
shares their views respecting the Islamicity oftheir actions or merely 
cynically adopts them to remain relevant is ultimately beside the 
point. He must advocate in their favor, and ifhe did not, whether out 
of conviction or otherwise, his popularity would wane among the sec­
tions of the Muslim community that currently listens to him. In that 
case, another, more suitable "traditionalist" would take his place. 
Qaradawi can, and does, decry the activities of September 11 on tra­
ditionalist grounds,214 but Hamas cannot seriously be questioned. 
At the same time, however, a clear, separate influence on Islamic 
doctrine on jihad has been the need of Muslim societies to comply 
with broader global expectations in the political sphere, ifMuslim so­
cieties are to be relevant, and more importantly, powerful, in the con­
temporary era, is. Hence, for example, when the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference justifies its position on the relationship between 
resistance and terrorism in a document commonly referred to as the 
Kuala Lumpur Declaration, its principles appear incoherent, because 
208. GlobaISecurity.org, Ramas (Islamic Resistance Movement), http://www.global 
security.org/military/world/para/hamas.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
209. See www.moqawama.org/israel (last visited May 10, 2007). 
210. See, e.g., www.albasrah.net (popular insurgency website, referring to the "re­
sistance" against American instrusion) (last visited May 10, 2007). 
211. Kuala Lumpur Declaration, supra note 34, at art. 8. 
212. SHERMAN JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE; THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURIS­
PRUDENCE OF SHIHAB AL-DIN AL-QARAFI xxxii (1996) (describing Qaradawi as being 
idenitified as an authority "in the tradition of classical Islamic law"). 
213. FELDMAN, supra note 48, at 64. 
214. Id. 
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of the need both to meet modern Muslim expectations concerning ji· 
had as resistance and to appear not shockingly divergent from global 
expectations, which could have broad ramifications in the form of dip­
lomatic and economic isolation that Muslim societies seeking ad­
vancement would necessarily wish to avoid. 
Thus, Article 4 of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration indicates that 
the true teachings of Islam prohibit the killing of innocent people. 215 
However, Article 8 seeks to exempt from any definition of terrorism, 
on the basis of the UN Charter and international law, "resistance to 
foreign aggression and the struggle of peoples under colonial or alien 
domination and foreign occupation for national liberation and self­
determination."216 Articles 10 and 11 then further exempt the Pales­
tinian and Lebanese "resistance" from terrorism, and Article 12 de­
plores Israeli activities against the Palestinians.217 
It is hard to make very much sense of this. First of all, no provi­
sion of the UN Charter or principle of international law does or could 
permit activities that otherwise would fall under the rubric of terror­
ism so long as they can be described as acts of "resistance" under­
taken in the course of "struggles by peoples under colonial or alien 
domination." Secondly, it is unclear why, ifIslam deplores the killing 
of innocent civilians under article 4, there is any need to exempt the 
resistance of article 8 from the definition of terrorism, particularly in 
the case of Hamas. In other words, it is not clear what Hamas would 
seek to do in furtherance of its self-proclaimed resistance that would 
be prohibited under any reasonable definition of terrorism other than 
suicide bombing. Finally, it is unclear how the Declaration can ex­
empt, seemingly entirely, the Palestinian resistance, condemn Israel, 
and deplore the killing of innocent civilians without a mention of sui­
cide attacks undertaken by Hamas against Israeli civilians. Are 
these then to be condemned as un-Islamic attacks on innocent civil­
ians, or are they legitimate resistance against colonial or alien domi­
nation? The Declaration seems designed to avoid answering this 
question, which, for a document meant to announce the position of 
the Muslim nations of the world on the subject of terrorism, is quite 
surprising. 
It is only in understanding the tension between the importance 
of resistance and the necessity of compliance with global expectations 
that the explanation for the seeming confusion becomes apparent. 
The impossible references to international law and the UN Charter 
are obviously meant to assure the broader world of the willingness of 
Muslim nations to accept international norms, and the references to 
resistance may as well have been taken directly from spokesmen 
215. Kuala Lumpur Declaration, supra note 34, at art. 4. 
216. ld. at art. 8. 
217. ld. at arts. 10-12. 
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from anyone of the jihads currently convulsing the Middle East. 
They are forced together in a manner that makes almost no sense, 
justifying modern expressions of jihad on the basis of international 
documents in a manner that few non-Muslim nations would accept. 
As for the references to "innocent civilians," they provide double as­
surance. They signal to the international community the Muslim de­
sire for peace and engagement, of course. On the other hand, they 
are designed to conform to the claims of the resistance, which takes 
the position that no Israeli adult is an innocent civilian because all 
participate in the military, at least in reserve status, a position which 
speaks volumes respecting the extent to which militant Muslims seek 
to defend their actions on the basis of self-defense. 218 It is only 
through understanding this very contemporary form of shari'a and 
the influences that led to its creation that the position of the Ole, and 
modern Muslims, on the subject of resistance, terrorism, jihad and 
the law of war could possibly be understood. 
The same might be said of criminal law within the nation states 
that seek to apply the harsh criminal sanctions in the shari'a known 
as the hudud, which include the amputation of the hands of thieves 
and the stoning of adulterers. Professor Feldman, for example, 
whose work on reconciling Islam and democracy is laudable for its 
refusal to dwell extensively on classical doctrine and instead focus on 
what approaches Muslim communities are accepting by way of 
shari'a,219 seems to lose his Realist focus in the area of criminal law. 
In discussing recent attempts to implement the hudud in various Is­
lamic countries, Feldman dismisses them as not entirely Islamic be­
cause they are the result of political factors, not Islamic doctrine.220 
Feldman informs us that under the classical rules, there is almost 
always a legal way to avoid enforcement of the hudud. 221 
One wonders whether Feldman has fallen into the familiar trap 
of the political liberal, where innovative, salutary interpretations of 
text that massage doctrine to conform to contemporary cultural and 
political realities must be accepted on their terms, but alternative in­
terpretations that are equally creative but lead to less salutary re­
sults may be dismissed as a product of "politics." The question is not 
whether or not there is a way to avoid the hudud under the classical 
rules, presumably those who want to enforce the rules can find classi­
cal sources that justify their position as easily as Professor Feldman 
can find excuses not to enforce. The issue for the modern commenta­
tor is why these particular punishments are being grafted onto an 
218. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch Report, Suicide Bombers Commit Crimes 
Against Humanity, Nov. 1,2002, available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/11/isrl­
pal101.htm. 
219. FELDMAN, supra note 48, at 54. 
220. Id. at 72. 
221. Id. 
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otherwise modern criminal code now, and what this tells us about the 
shari'a in the modern era. Again, resistance seems central to the par­
adigm, a means to demonstrate a moral and social order and a unique 
Islamic identity in contradistinction to that of the decadent and de­
bauched West. That the principles of nulla poena/nullum crimen 
sine legem have been incorporated, in derogation of the rules of the 
classical era, only demonstrates the extent to which these same socie­
ties understand and incorporate as necessary for advancement the 
structure of the pervasive and highly regulated nation state of the 
West, with its detailed codes and extensive administrative regime. 
I could continue the discussion for some time on these conflicting 
tensions, from AI Qaeda's rejection of democratic rule and its em­
brace of Western technology, to the wide acceptance by modern Mus­
lims, even conservatives, of the prohibition of slavery in the modern 
world (because, it is said, the shari'a circumscribed and disapproved 
of the practice, and therefore a ban is entirely logical)222 and the si­
multaneous indignation of many Muslims, especially conservatives, 
at any proposal to prohibit polygamy (because while the shari'a cir­
cumscribes and disapproves of polygamy, nowhere is the practice 
banned).223 More work is required to expand these ideas further. 
It would seem that in this post-Realist age, we in the American 
legal academy should be well aware that faithful harmony to classical 
rules that, as Professor Abu Odeh points out, have not been in appli­
cation for hundreds of years, are not the driving force behind the pop­
ularity of particularly and peculiarly pan-national Islamic positions, 
on commerce, finance, jihad, criminal law, family law and numerous 
222. Popular Muslim websites, for example, emphasize the fact that foundational 
text disapproves of slavery and sets the conditions for its ultimate demise, conve­
niently omitting the fact that centuries of legal rulings enabled a significant expan­
sion of the slave practice in the Muslim world. See, e.g., Understanding Islam 
Website, http://www.understanding-islam.com/related/text.asp?type=question&qid= 
652 (last visited Dec. 2, 2007) ("Islam has always been against the very existence of 
the institution of slavery. Nevertheless, like most of the other social phenomena, 
slavery too, because of its deep roots in the society, could not have been abolished by a 
single stroke of the ruler's pen."). See also Website of Digital Ahl ul Bayt Islamic 
Library Project, http://www.al-islam.org/organizations/aalimnetwork/msgOO224.html 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2007). This IS not to suggest that all modern Muslim approaches 
to a slavery ban are equally ahistorical or naive. My colleague Professor Freamon 
advocates for an expansive use ofthe doctrine of consensus, or ijma, under the shari'a 
to give binding effect to the opinion of nearly all contemporary Muslims that slavery 
should be prohibited. See generally Bernard Freamon, Slavery, Freedom and the Doc­
trine of Consensus in Islamic Jurisprudence, 11 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1988). In so 
doing, Professor Freamon stands out as an exception to the rule respecting legal aca­
demics in American law schools, one willing to jettison the classical rules in favor of 
current Muslim positions on Muslim doctrine. 
223. Understanding Islam Website, http://www.understanding-islam.com/related/ 
text.asp?type=question&qid=573&sscatid=411 (last visited Dec. 2, 2007) ("... even 
though an ideal family setup consists of one husband and one wife, there can be a 
number of situations where the society demands of a person to compromise the ideal 
family setup and enter into a second marriage for the general good of the society."). 
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other subjects relevant today. It is time to abandon the doctrinal ob­
sessions and turn to those social and political factors that drive a sub­
stantial portion of the Muslim world to seek a robust new role for the 
shari'a to control affairs and institutions of human association. This 
is only the extension of Realist thought to the Islamic arena, a recog­
nition that ultimately any attempted recreation of history in the es­
tablishment of legal, political or social order is ultimately an 
invention of the past, and that contemporary circumstances and so­
cial forces more than historic doctrine control the outcome. 
An approach of this sort places the shari'a in a new light, with a 
new means to understand and engage the Muslim world. Quite 
clearly, for example, though Islamic finance is in many ways a form 
of protest against the established commercial order, economic "resis­
tance" of a sort, some cooperation in the creation of forms of Islamic 
commerce can be made. A serious and honest discussion can take 
place about the means (and the desirability) to achieve Islamicity in 
finance in a manner both commercially practicable and meeting the 
demands of modern Muslims respecting social justice and fairness. 
An altogether different approach might be required with respect to 
the creeping influence of modern forms of shari'a in matters such as 
the law of war and criminal law. Nevertheless, if the shari'a is con­
sidered in this way, the need to study and teach this pan-national 
Islamic law, and the fermentation of Islamic thought that has arisen 
as a reaction and a consequence (some of it modernizing, some less 
so), seems of paramount importance. Seen in this light, Professor 
Abu Odeh's thesis that Islam has been largely privatized and that 
generalized Islamic law is not relevant to understanding Muslim na­
tion states and their citizens is a very difficult proposition to defend. 
Perhaps the greatest irony concerning the obsession with formal­
ist adherence to classical doctrine in our academy is that in many 
ways we lag behind the Islamic scholarly community itself in this re­
spect. Some jurists themselves realized the futility of trying to faith­
fully replicate classical doctrine, most notably Sadr. Rather than 
patronize his fellow Muslims or seek to confuse them with lengthy 
discourses in obscure language, as most jurists of his time did, Sadr's 
work on economics and commerce, as well as numerous other sub­
jects, is accessible and easy to understand.224 In his discussions on 
interpretation and modernization of classical rules, Sadr does not 
hide from the realities of his interpretive effort and claim to have 
mastered some sort of neutral process wherein he may understand 
the purpose or letter of God's Will, or the meaning of the classical 
doctors, better than others. Rather, he admits quite openly that the 
interpretive process is deeply influenced by what he calls "subjectiv­
ity" (dhatiyya) and that any jurist engaging in the process of review­
224. Aziz, supra note 158, at 210. 
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ing classical exegesis is going to find rulings that correspond closely 
to his vision oflegal or economic order, and rulings that seem to devi­
ate considerably from them. 225 In such cases, the jurist has no choice 
but to select the rules that conform to his own vision.226 An excellent 
place to begin the discussion . . . . 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The central flaw in evaluating Islamic law in the American acad­
emy is the reliance on the false assumption that contemporary Is­
lamic rules are derived from classical doctrine. This has led both 
admirers and detractors of the manner in which current Islamic law 
is currently studied and taught in US law schools to focus their ener­
gies on obsolete medieval rules that bear no relationship to the man­
ner in which modern Muslims approach shari'a. The reality is that 
given the structural pluralism of the rules of the classical era, there 
is no sensible way that modern rules could be derived from classical 
doctrine, either in letter or in spirit, and all efforts to do so have 
largely failed. As with all historical approaches to the law, the past 
becomes no more than an invention of the present, a means to vali­
date an approach rather than any true reflection of the practices and 
norms of a previous era. Thus, modern Islamic rules are not a resur­
rection of classical era rules, but rather are largely the product of 
mediation among competing influences in Muslim society. Within 
and even beyond Islamic finance, the two major influences are, on the 
one hand, resistance against the dominant global economic and polit­
ical order to create a separate Muslim polity with its own ethical and 
cultural norms, and on the other, the need to engage the broader 
world, commercially and politically, in order to develop power and in­
fluence. A proper study of influences of this sort that have led large 
numbers of Muslims to adopt particular pan-national shari'a posi­
tions on economics, finance, war and numerous other realms is abso­
lutely vital in the post 9/11 era in order to engage substantial, 
important segments of the Muslim community. 
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